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Introduction 
Many of science’s most revolutionary discoveries concern deep time: the past stretching 
beyond memory and written texts. One discovery was deep time itself. In Europe at least, the 
realization that the Earth outruns by millennia both biblical history and our own species’ 
existence shook conceptions of humanity’s place in the world just as surely as earlier 
astronomical discoveries (Rudwick 2014). But the past isn’t simply long. Before Homo sapiens, the 
climate and continents shifted while diverse lineages arose, became extinct and others evolved. 
We are the result of millions of years of evolution, a heritage that shapes and constrains how we 
adapt to our still-changing world. Before written records, then, there wasn’t simply a past—there 
was history. Scientific understanding of the deep past emerged in the 19th Century and crucial 
aspects, how plate tectonics shape geography and climate for instance, have only been accepted 
in the last half-century (Oreskes 1999). Considering the extent to which extinction, evolution, 
plate tectonics, and deep time itself form the furniture of our conceptions of the world and our 
place within it, their recent pedigree is startling.  
In what follows, we’ll examine the nature and epistemology of this ‘deep past’; what we 
might call prehistorical history. How do historical scientists reach beyond human memory? How 
does the nature of the past constrain our knowledge? How does history matter for knowing? 
Our central question, then, concerns the relationship between history and knowledge. In 
making inferences, as well as understanding and explaining the world, does history matter? There 
are at least two ways in which it might. First, is there something special about trying to 
understand processes or entities located in the past, as opposed to in the present or future? That 
is, are there systematic claims to be made about the epistemic status of past things in virtue of 
their being past? Second, does something’s history matter to the knowledge we can have of it? 
The former question concerns whether a target’s being in the past makes it special qua object of 
knowledge. The latter concerns whether a target’s history matters for how we might come to 
know it.  
Regarding that first question, I’ll draw a negative conclusion: processes and patterns in the 
past do not represent a fundamentally different kind of epistemic target than those occupying 
different temporal locations. Regarding the second question, I’ll draw a positive conclusion, for 
two reasons: (1) the past matters for all scientific inference because the provenance of an 
inference’s data always matters; (2) history matters because how a target came to be can make a 
difference to what knowledge we can have of it. Note an ambiguity: by ‘history’ do we mean 
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simply being past, or do we mean something richer—having a particular kind of past, or 
instantiating a particular kind of dynamics? Throughout, I’ll typically reserve the term ‘history’ for 
this latter notion: ‘history’ doesn’t so much pick out a temporal location (the past) as it picks out 
a set of events, entities or processes for whom distinctive, ‘historical’ features make a difference 
to how we might know them. What might these historical features be? Well, that question is in a 
nutshell what this book is about. 
We’ll also ask after the epistemic value of such enquiries. I’ll suggest that investigating the 
deep past involves more than considering particular histories: we delve into the great diversity of 
forms, structures, trajectories, events, entities and processes that constitute and shape the 
world, and the conditions enabling them; we bring contemporary conceptions to the past in 
analysis, data-gathering and interpretation, and that past in turn shapes those conceptions. Thus, 
history matters for knowledge, and the process of understanding the deep past is rich and 
invaluable.   
Finally, knowing about the past is necessary for understanding much of what we’d like to 
know. We occupy an often unrepresentative, atypical sliver of time. Our immediately accessible 
sample is biased, extremely incomplete, inadequate to answer questions at long scales (Marshall 
2017). These questions are Big. How does evolution work? How do planets, solar systems and the 
universe form? What explains geographical patterns: mountain ranges, valleys? How did our 
species evolve and radiate across the globe? And these questions matter: How do species 
become extinct, how do changes in atmospheric composition alter global temperatures, and how 
do changes in global temperatures affect everything else? Answering these questions requires 
evidence and perspectives which overcome the inherent bias of our little sliver: a long-term view 
into the deep past. History matters at least because knowledge of it is necessary for answering 
Big Questions. 
The book is divided into three related parts. In the first, I consider the relationship between 
evidence, justification and the deep past. In the second, I consider the nature and contingency of 
history. In the third, I turn to narrative explanation and its role in history. I conclude with a 
discussion of the value and purpose of historical science itself. I haven’t quite written an 
introduction to the philosophy of the historical sciences. It is instead an extended essay on the 
relationship between history and knowledge. Given the aims of the Elements series—to be 
accessible yet substantive—I’ve aimed for ambition over completeness. Better, I think, to push 
the boat into deep waters and risk foundering than to stick to cautious shallows.   
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Part 1: History & Evidence 
History and evidence are intertwined: to ask certain questions we need a long-term scale; to 
uncover the past we require at least some of its remnants to join us in the present. But is there 
something special about historical evidence: is it particularly difficult, or impoverished, or 
privileged? Some have thought so.  
Recently, Derek Turner (2004, 2007) argued that historical evidence is systematically less 
powerful than experimental evidence; Carol Cleland (2002, 2011, 2013) argued that historical 
evidence underwrites a distinctive method which is at least equal to more familiar forms of 
scientific knowledge. Such arguments appeal to some fundamental ontological or 
epistemological differences between the past on the one hand, and the present and future on 
the other. For Turner, investigating the past denies us the boon of repeated experimental 
investigation; for Cleland, investigation of the past grants the boon of bountiful traces. 
I’ll argue that although in historical contexts evidence’s past matters, this is true of all 
evidence, and so carries with it no special insight about historical knowledge per se. There is 
nothing distinctive, epistemically speaking, about past objects of knowledge. I’ll begin with a 
methodological discussion, arguing that to understand how history matters for knowledge, we 
should begin by understanding the practices which generate such knowledge. This motivates 
examining historical reasoning ‘in play’: we’ll look at recent work on dinosaur development. 
Based on that case study, I’ll then characterize ‘trace-based reasoning’, presenting and resolving 
a puzzle concerning it, before considering the relationship between experimental reasoning and 
trace-based reasoning. I’ll conclude that no evidential reasoning escapes history; however, a 
target’s being in the past doesn’t in and of itself raise distinctive epistemic challenges. 
1.1 The very possibility of historical knowledge 
Where should our project begin? That is, to understand the relationship between knowledge 
and the deep past, which philosophical approach is appropriate? I think our starting point should 
be the practices of historical scientists themselves, but let’s consider a few options to see why.  
Perhaps we should ask after historical knowledge’s very possibility: what is necessary for 
justified knowledge about any past occurrence? Roughly a century ago, Bertrand Russell posed a 
thought experiment (Russell 1921). Imagine that the world blinked into existence five minutes 
ago: a world which is in-every-way identical to the world as it is, except its past is only 300 
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seconds long. An identical duplicate, containing all the same memories, fossils, elementary 
particles, and so forth, as our world.  Can we tell whether we live in a billions-of-years-old, or 300-
seconds-old, universe? As Russell points out, 
There is no logical impossibility in the hypothesis that the world sprang into existence five 
minutes ago, exactly as it then was, with a population that "remembered" a wholly unreal 
past. There is no logically necessary connection between events at different times; 
therefore nothing that is happening now or will happen in the future can disprove the 
hypothesis that the world began five minutes ago.... (Russell 1921, 158) 
All present evidence underdetermines the hypothesis that the world has a long past and the 
hypothesis that the world blinked into existence five minutes (or twenty minutes, or three 
seconds) ago. ‘Underdetermination’ is a relationship between at least two hypotheses and a 
body of evidence: when the evidence is insufficient to decide between those hypotheses, they 
are underdetermined by it (Wylie forthcoming, Godfrey-Smith 2008, Laudan 1990). Under 
Russell’s scenario any observations we might make now are the same whether or not the past 
existed for billions of years or 300 seconds. However, under the sceptical hypothesis, all claims 
about the past beyond those five minutes appear to come out false, while under the standard 
hypothesis some at least are true. In one world it is approximately true that (non-avian) 
Dinosaurs died out 65.5 million years ago, in the other, (ignoring philosophical finagling about the 
nature of truth and reference) it is false.  
What are we to make of such hypotheses? We might take our cue from Russell himself: 
I am not here suggesting that the non-existence of the past should be entertained as a 
serious hypothesis. Like all sceptical hypotheses, it is logically tenable but uninteresting 
(Russell, 1921, p. 159-160). 
I don’t think Russell is quite right about this1. One take-home message is that our knowing 
about the past depends upon features of the past itself: in this extreme case it depends upon the 
past existing (or having had existed). If our knowledge of the past is to be like other empirical 
knowledge, then it is predicated on there being something that our knowledge is about. Russell 
is right that, as a serious hypothesis, the 5-minute-hypothesis is rather uninteresting. After all, if 
no possible observation might make a difference to our status as knowers, what are we to do but 
                                                             
1 Russell’s thought experiment is intended only to demonstrate that induction cannot rest on logical, 
deductive grounds. 
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shrug? But the thought that knowledge of the past depends in part on its nature deserves 
reflection (which I’ll turn to in Part 2).  
Russell’s sceptical hypothesis is an extreme version of a common philosophical approach. 
Such approaches begin by generating an epistemic demand: a philosophical bar is set, and 
knowledge-claims are checked to see if they can make the jump. Some claims, or sets of claims, 
might be high-jumpers, while others flop (and not in the Fosbury sense). We proceed by asking 
who makes it over the bar and who fails? Can we answer Russell’s sceptic? These are grand, even 
gallant, starting places—but I think they aren’t the only (nor the most productive) opening salvos 
we might make. 
Perhaps we should start by asking whether there are fundamental differences between the 
past, present and future. If such fundamental differences are to be had, these could constrain or 
enable different kinds of knowledge or routes to knowledge. Here, we begin by considering the 
ontology of the past, in contrast to the present and future. Carol Cleland (2002, 2011) argues for 
something like this. She claims there is a physical asymmetry between the present’s relationship 
to the past and the present’s relationship to the future. Causes have multiple effects, and these 
spread through time. This multiplying aspect, according to Cleland, leads the present to 
overdetermine the past. That is, the way things are now are more than sufficient to guarantee 
the ways things were. And not so the future, hence the asymmetry. Arthur Danto (1962) says 
something similar. The fixity of the past, for him, stands in stark contrast with the open future. 
And in virtue of this, our retrospective understanding of the past is simply of a different nature 
than our capacity (or lack thereof) to predict the future. 
For Cleland, the temporal asymmetry underwrites the method historical scientists adopt. An 
approach which similarly ties together the relationship between the past and present, and 
scientific method, is uniformitarianism. The term was coined by the 19th Century geologist 
Charles Lyell (1837) and has undergone various—often increasingly complex—incarnations (see 
Gould 1965, Camardi 1994, although I’m basing my discussion on Rudwick’s treatments, 1972, 
2014). For our purposes, we can divide the idea into two claims: actualism and gradualism. 
Actualism claims that our knowledge of the past needs to be grounded in examinations of 
processes acting today: it is about how to get knowledge. Gradualism claims that processes in 
the past occurred at roughly the same rate as they occur today. Specifically, change is slow, 
incremental: great mountains and deep seas are formed by slow local changes; biodiversity is due 
to patterns of individual survival, birth and death within particular populations. There are merely 
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methodological or pragmatic versions of uniformitarianism which avoid substantive claims about 
the past, but such positions have nothing to say about the pre-requisites of past knowledge. 
Taking actualism and gradualism together, then, we have uniformitarianism. Actualism says 
that current processes are the key to past processes, and gradualism says that geological 
features are the result of those processes acting incrementally on grand scales; small changes 
scaled-up explain big changes: water trickles form mighty gorges.  
Understood in a sufficiently weak way, actualism is important. In order to make inferences 
about the past, we need traces. We need to find remains—footprints, fossils, cave paintings, 
droppings, and so on. Further, to make those inferences we need to understand the processes 
which shape the past, and examining current processes is one way of achieving this. Although I 
think taking traces as the basis of our knowledge about the past can be (and typically is) taken far 
too far (see Currie 2018 chapters 6 to 11), and that there are many ways in which past processes 
might differ from current processes, no doubt we have to start somewhere. Here, then, is a 
beginning for our examination of historical knowledge: 
Knowing about the past requires taking the present as having been shaped by its past—that is, 
to contain some kind of record which we can either decode, or perhaps decode one day2. 
Such a thought underwrites the trace-based reasoning we’ll meet below. 
Uniformitarianism’s other half—gradualism—fares worse. Gradualism claims that change is 
slow and incremental, however, there are plenty of exceptions. Let’s glance at a geological and 
then a biological example. ‘Outburst floods’ are enormous floods occurring when previously 
dammed lakes are freed. Such floods shaped North America’s distinctive geology, often due to 
ice-age glacial blockades melting. This freed superlative amounts of water, which gouged out 
massive valleys and were partly responsible for the layers of soft and hard stone necessary for 
Badlands to form, as well as potentially changing weather patterns (Kehew & Teller 1994). These 
are anything but gradual processes. 
In biology, gradual speciation has been challenged in two ways. The most obviously gradual 
model of speciation is anagenic: one species gradually shades into another. We can contrast this 
with cladogenic speciation, when speciation occurs by ‘splitting’ two populations. There is 
considerable ongoing debate over to what extent speciation follows each process, but I’d be 
surprised if one model dominates (Plutynski 2018). On a macroevolutionary scale, we can 
                                                             
2 Derek Turner would point out the explicit textual metaphor here! 
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compare phyletic speciation—the thought that speciation occurs with gradual, steady change—
with punctuated equilibrium (Gould & Eldredge 1993). On the latter view, over evolutionary time 
most species are typically in stasis but when change comes, it comes dramatically. Again, there is 
debate about to what extent stasis or change is the dominant pattern in evolution, and to what 
extent speciation is gradual or punctuated. In light of these kinds of examples we can’t just 
assume gradual speciation nor, I think, can we assume gradualism more generally. 
Approaching the relationship between history and knowledge by starting with in-principle 
constraints on the possibility of knowing the past, or considering the relationship between the 
past and present abstractly, has a set of attendant risks. Such accounts often commit to a 
particular analysis of knowledge, or to particular metaphysical views, making their story about 
historical knowledge beholden to the fate of those commitments. I think we should avoid 
hitching our wagon to a particular analysis of the nature of knowledge or of the relationship 
between past and present. There is a danger of being fatally disconnected from the phenomena 
we’re trying to understand. The hard-won, transformative historical knowledge that impressed 
us in the introduction was achieved via human ingenuity and sweat; it wasn’t bequeathed from 
some general fundamental fact about the world, and the phenomenon holds independently of 
our solving philosophical puzzles about knowledge. The task of actually explaining how historical 
scientists successfully investigate the often obscure, often weirdly alien recesses of the deep past 
remains even if we’ve answered such questions. Under these conditions, striving for 
philosophical grounding can become a distraction, a red-herring, a roadblock to understanding. 
I think a better approach starts with scientific practice: that is, we should examine what 
scientists actually do. Instead of doing philosophy first—setting a philosophical standard and 
examining practices to see if they meet it—we start with an examination of scientific work. How 
do historical scientists reason? What kinds of evidence do they provide? What knowledge-
generating processes—fieldwork, experimentation, etc…--do they engage in? After examining 
science, we see what philosophical systematization and lessons might be drawn from these 
practices. As such, we’ll start by delving into some paleontology in the next section. 
 You might complain: if my philosophical analysis begins with a descriptive case study, can I 
do the explanatory, normative work philosophy demands? If my criteria for good evidence is 
derived from descriptions of practice, don’t I face a methodological dilemma? On one horn, my 
analysis is restricted to mere description, thus falling short of my normative goals; on the other 
horn, I fall afoul of the dictum that one mustn’t derive an ought from an is. I think this complaint 
is mistaken: my discussion is neither purely descriptive nor normative and (or so I hope) avoids 
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problematic circularity (Currie 2015). To see why, I invite you to come along for the ride. In my 
concluding discussion I’ll suggest that our reflections on the nature of the deep past and our 
knowledge of it are applicable to philosophy, and in a way that enables escape from this 
dilemma.  
1.2 Growing up dinosaur 
The archaeologist Christopher Hawkes saw historical texts as a crucial evidential crutch 
supporting old-world archaeology. Even if the target culture did not leave a written tradition, if it 
is in some way continuous with a culture which did, that continuity can underwrite rich 
reconstructions of cultural pasts: 
In rural economy, burial rites, technology, sociology or what not, there is always, 
somewhere or other, a point of reference within the historic order (Hawkes 1954, 160). 
For Hawkes, insofar as we can rely on (and stretch) written records—find a point of 
reference—we can make inferences from material remains to specific, contingent features of 
past human societies. For the biology of the deep past, living descendants are the equivalent of 
historical texts. If an extinct critter has close relatives in the present, then examining those 
relatives can be an often powerful guide, providing a point of reference within living biota.  
This is what makes dinosaurs so challenging. 
Dinosaurs’ closest living relatives are their progeny, the birds, and their cousins, the 
crocodilians. These lineages share a common ancestor around 240 million years ago, in the midst 
of the Triassic period (Green et al 2014). Although birds and crocodiles provide some guidance for 
dinosaur palaeontologists, millions of years of evolution opened wide morphological, 
physiological, and behavioural differences between these lineages. Neither living crocodiles nor 
birds, for instance, include in their ranks multi-ton, terrestrial, herd-living herbivores. If we wish to 
understand these critters, the horned and frilled ceratopsids, plumed Hadrosaurs, entanked 
ankylosaurs and earth-shaking sauropods, do we look to birds and crocodiles, or to their 
mammalian analogues (elephants and hippopotami), or to some combination of both? Are 
triceratops and friends more like scaled-up, wingless birds, or like reptiles playing at 
mammalhood? Are they somewhere in between? Are they something else entirely? To see these 
difficulties in play and how scientists respond, let’s consider dinosaur ‘ontogenetic development’: 
their patterns of growth. 
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It is misleading to think that paleontology ‘starts’ with fieldwork, but our examination of 
dinosaur development has to begin somewhere. Fieldwork is not simply a matter of finding 
fossils. Specimen discovery is often challenging, and requires decisions about where to look and 
what is worth digging up. Fossil extraction is typically destructive. Fossils (particularly of larger 
animals) often weigh many tons, and don’t typically hang out in convenient locations. Of those 
fossils that are retrieved, decisions must be made about storage and preparation. Preparing 
fossils is necessary for them to be analysed: only once the biological signal of the fossil has been 
split from the surrounding rock, can we discern and measure morphology (Wylie 2015). And fossil 
preparation is an onerous task. Post-preparation, decisions must then be made about which 
prepared fossils are worth analysing, how they should be stored, and so forth. Each step, finding 
the fossil, deciding to dig it up, preparing it, and then analysing it, require judgements about how 
to spend limited resources towards several—often conflicting—goals (Turner 2016).  Building 
data sets often involves specimens which were dug up and prepared with different practices and 
different questions in mind.  And sometimes these differences make reconciling old data with 
new difficult (Wylie 2017). Further, each step introduces a new possible source of bias in the 
eventual data (Wylie forthcoming). The journey from discovery to evidential use is multi-stepped, 
and each step matters. Often a specimen having been extracted and prepared isn’t sufficient for 
its use as evidence: palaeontologists adopt standards designed to preserve the authenticity and 
epistemic properties of fossil remains. Leading paleontological journals, for instance, do not 
accept new species on the basis of privately owned fossils, partly for ethical, partly for epistemic 
reasons (Havstad forthcoming). Much of these complexities are encapsulated in Jack Horner and 
Mark Goodwin’s investigation of how Triceratops grew.  
Triceratops are instantly recognizable, three-horned ceratopsids from the North American 
Cretaceous. Although Triceratops specimens are relatively common (for dinosaurs), back in 2006 
only four non-adults were described in published literature. This was partly because “smaller 
Triceratops skulls and cranial elements were apparently overlooked, deemed highly incomplete 
or undesirable to collect” (Horner & Goodwin 2006, 2757). Non-adult skulls are often more 
brittle, so less likely to survive the fossilization process, and those which do survive are typically 
incomplete. So if you’re looking for the ‘best’—most complete—skulls, then you’ll focus on 
adults. The aims and standards of collecting affect what is collected (Wylie 2017). Further, many 
of the Triceratops prepared in the past were prepared towards ends other than understanding 
their growth: “…many previously collected Triceratops skulls in museum collections have 
undergone extensive restoration, are composites or lack contextual field documentation, making 
their use unreliable” (2757).  
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In 1997, crews from the Museum of the Rockies and the University of California Berkeley 
began working the Hell Creek Formation in eastern Montana, aiming for a collection suitable for 
studying Triceratops development. The specimens were prepared under Horner & Goodwin’s 
supervision, providing 10 full and 28 partial skulls. 
By sorting the skulls by size and other signals of age, Horner & Goodwin hypothesize a four 
stage sequence taking us from infant, juvenile, sub-adult to adult Triceratops (see figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Horner & Goodwin's triceratops growth sequence. (Horner & Goodwin 2006, 2760) © Royal Society. 
Even to uneducated eyes, the changes over a Triceratops’ lifetime are striking. Most obvious 
are changes in the ‘frill’ (the bony crest jutting out the back of the skull) and in the ‘postorbital’ 
horns (the two horns above the eyes). The frill begins rather unambitiously, jutting straight out 
the back in infants (a), to increasingly splayed and dramatic across juveniles and sub-adults (b – 
c). More strikingly, the postorbital horns jut upwards with a slight backwards lean in early life 
stages (a –c), but change dramatically in adulthood (d – e), bending forwards over the eye. 
Why does understanding Triceratops growth matter? What motivated nine years of 
collection, preparation, analysis and publishing? The reconstruction underwrites further 
speculation on Horner & Goodwin’s part. They suggest that changes in postorbital horns are 
“probably visual cues of immaturity” (2761). A quick glance at horn position would be a useful 
way for Triceratops to gauge age. More dramatically, in 2011 Horner, this time with John 
Scannella, combined this sequence with another ceratopsid, Torosaurus, to argue that the two 
were not different genera after all, but that Torosaurus represented the final adult stage of 
Triceratops. So, the proposed growth sequence provided a basis for further speculation and led 
to previous interpretations being re-evaluated. 
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Further, Triceratops skulls inform us about more than ontogeny. Scannella, Fowler, Goodwin 
and Horner (2014) used the same skulls to argue that Triceratops species evolved by gradual 
transformation. Triceratops in the Hell Creek formation have two morphotypes: T. horridus and T. 
prorsus. Instead of arranging skulls by life-stage, Scannella and company arranged them by 
stratigraphic sequence (that is, organized by the layer of rock they were discovered in). Because 
strata are laid down sequentially over time, a stratigraphic sequence can (with some care) be 
read as a temporal sequence. The pattern reinforced T. horridus and T. prorsus being separate 
species, but more interestingly, the scientists also argued that the sequence reveals anagenesis 
(recall: speciation via gradual transformation of a whole lineage). A cladogenic speciation would 
express itself in the record differently from an anagenic one. Across the sample there was no 
stratigraphic overlap and there were apparently transitional forms: highly suggestive of 
anagenesis. 
For Scannella, Fowler, Goodwin and Horner, the discovery of anagenetic patterns of 
speciation in Triceratops is significant because it helps set expectations about evolutionary 
patterns in that lineage. Assuming cladogenic change would lead to a “problematic inflation of 
dinosaur diversity” (5). We’ll expand on dinosaur biodiversity below but first, let’s consider 
another case. 
Ceratopsids are not the only late-Cretaceous critters to have undergone ontogenetic study. 
Another group, also very diverse in the Cretaceous, and also sporting distinctive skulls, are the 
Pachycephalosaurids, a group of hadrosaurs. Pachycephalosaurs are famous for their bony, 
thickened skulls—often represented as head-butting-based male-male competition over mates 
(ala big horn sheep, although some argue display is just as plausible, Peterson & Vittore 2012). 
Pachycephalosaurid species are identified by their skulls, which are typically divided into two 
types. Although all are thick, in one group the skull is shaped to form a dome, in the other the 
skull is flat. How are these two types related? On one view, they are divided into two clades: 
Homalocephale (the flat-heads) and Pachycephalosauidae (the classic dome-heads). On another 
view, the dome-heads cluster together but the flat-heads do not. Recently, a third option has 
emerged: once again, an ontogenetic difference has been mistaken for a phylogenetic difference. 
Following past suggestions (Goodwin et al 1998, Sullivan 2003), Schott et al (2010) analyse the 
skulls of two well-sampled lineages: the dome-headed Stegocera validum and the flat-headed 
Ornatotholus browni. They “test the hypothesis that Stegoceras validum developed 
ontogenetically from a flat-headed morphology to a domed morphology using multiple 
independent lines of evidence on a large, stratigraphically constrained sample of specimens… 
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from the Belly River Group of Alberta” (2). Let’s examine the lines of evidence, and the 
specimens. 
The lines of evidence involve, first, histology. Microscopic tissue structure sometimes 
fossilizes. Examining such structures can provide insight into growth patterns and help 
reconstruct ontogenetic sequences. For instance, highly vascularized (that is, complex, involving 
multiple cell-types) cells are often associated with fast—and perhaps later—growth. A second 
line of evidence exploits ‘diagnostic ornamentation’: highly conserved features taken to be 
excellent initial evidence of taxic affiliation. Third, evidence from ‘allopatric analyses’ of skull 
shape. That is, analyses which take various features of the skull and map them onto ontogenetic 
sequences constrained by expectations of growth patterns. Generally speaking, by 
reconstructing the growth sequence of the adult, Schott et al are able to show that various traits 
which dome heads have ‘grown out of’ are still present in the flat-headed taxa. Fourth and finally, 
the size-and-age ranges of the specimens is consistent with an ontogenetic sequence rather than 
a phylogenetic one. That is, the flat-headed specimens are smaller, and the two overlap in strata. 
Schott et al’s analyses are possible due to their carefully assembling a set of forty skull 
specimens, collected from the Dinosaur Park formation in Alberta. Although there are potential 
samples from New Mexico and Montana sites (where Horner’s ceratopsids hailed from) these 
were left out to “minimize the chances of sampling multiple taxa” (5). By restricting samples to a 
relatively constrained location and temporal period, they lessen the chance of noise from the 
inclusion of yet more species. As in the ceratopsid case, the investigations turn on careful field 
work, care taken in collections and preparation, and the materials then being stored (often for 
many years) before finally being deployed as evidence.  
Reassessments of dinosaur ontogeny and their taxonomic affiliation relate to more general 
patterns of biodiversity in the Cretaceous. The Cretaceous period began with a minor extinction 
event approximately 145.5 million years ago, and ends with the K-Pg extinction event 65.5 million 
years ago. In addition to the mass extinction closing act, another notable plot point is the mid-
Cretaceous Terrestrial Revolution (Lloyd et al 2008, Meredith et al 2011). Beginning roughly 125 
million years ago, land-based flora and fauna profoundly changed. Ferns and gymnosperms 
(conifers, cycads and their ilk) were replaced by the angiosperms: the flowering plants which 
now dominate Earth’s plant-life. By the late Cretaceous angiosperms dominated 80% of terrestrial 
plant biota (Benton 2010). Insects and other pollinators quickly radiated into new angiosperm-
based niches. Meanwhile, there’s evidence that early birds and mammals, as well as the already 
well-established squamate lizards and crocodilians, underwent major radiations (see Dilcher 2000 
History Matters 
13 
 
for plants, Grimaldi 1999 for insects, Hedges et al 1996 for birds and mammals). This all happened 
during a major geographical mix-up: the breaking apart of the super-continent Gondwana. In 
many ways, it was during the mid-Cretaceous that our modern world was formed, not in the 
crucible of the dinosaur extinction 60 million years later. 
It may be that dinosaurs took part in the mid-Cretaceous terrestrial revolution, particularly 
the herbivores. The Sauropod-dominated Jurassic landscape was replaced by ceratopsids, 
ankylosaur and Hadrosaur. However, it has been argued that apparent biodiversity increases in 
dinosaur are due to sampling bias (Lloyd et al 2008). A good understanding of dinosaur 
biodiversity is critical for telling to what extent they followed the trends of the mid-Cretaceous. It 
is also critical for resolving a puzzle about Cretaceous dinosaur megafauna: they appear to be too 
biodiverse, given our expectations from other assemblages of large animals (Sullivan 1996). 
Based on suggestions from studies of Pachycephalosaur and ceratopsids, a solution emerges: 
perhaps the biodiversity of late-Cretaceous dinosaurs has been inflated. First, as Scannella, 
Fowler, Goodwin and Horner imply, assumptions of cladogenic speciation could lead transitional 
forms to be classified as separate species. Second, the unexpected morphological changes 
dinosaurs underwent during growth could lead to ontogenetic differences being mistaken for 
phylogenetic differences.  
Finally, these re-evaluations of dinosaur biodiversity matter for understanding their 
extinction. Explaining the role (if it played a role) of the massive impact at the end of the 
Cretaceous depends in part on whether biota at the time were thriving, in decline, or in some way 
especially vulnerable. Although it is increasingly thought that biodiversity was relatively stable up 
until the K-Pg event (Lloyd et al 2008), there are now suggestions that the community structure 
of the late-Cretaceous dinosaurs changed in ways which decreased their resilience (Mitchell, 
Roopnarine & Angielczyk 2012). All of this work depends upon sufficiently accurate phylogenetic 
information, and this requires distinguishing between ontogeny and differing evolutionary 
history.  
These narratives concerning the relationship between the mid-Cretaceous Revolution, the 
new angiosperm-insect alliance, and the eventual dinosaur extinction, will play a prominent role 
in sections 2 and 3. For the remainder of this part, we’ll draw on reconstructions of dinosaur 
ontogeny to think about historical inferences. 
1.3 Trace-based Reasoning 
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The questions driving this book are, first, whether we can say anything systematic about a 
target’s epistemic status based on it being in the past; second, whether a target’s history makes a 
difference to what we might know of it. In 1.1 we briefly discussed actualism: our knowledge of 
the deep past is rooted in understanding how the past has shaped the present. If the present is 
our key to the past, then getting to the past requires intimate understanding of the present. In 
1.2, examining late-Cretaceous dinosaur development, we saw actualism enacted in concern for 
the careful treatment of fossils from fieldwork, to preparation, to scientific analysis. In this 
section I will characterize ‘trace-based reasoning’ more carefully, then pose and resolve 
something of a puzzle: this kind of reasoning seems far too powerful, it is ‘unreasonably 
effective’.  
A ‘trace’ is some down-stream remnant of a past event. A rock bears some similarity to 
biological morphology, and we explain those similarities as being due to the rock being a causal 
descendent of a once-living critter. We infer from Pachycephalosaur-skull-shaped rock to past 
Pachycephalosaurs. This capacity relies on knowing how a carbon-based skull could be 
transformed into other minerals. Generally speaking, to infer from a trace to the past we need 
some theory which explains how that past event could have led to the current state. Following 
Lewis Binford, such theory is typically called ‘middle-range’, or ‘midrange’ theory (Binford 1977, 
Jeffares 2008, Kosso 2001). Trace-based reasoning, then, involves inferring to the past on the 
basis of explaining things we observe today in terms of their being the result of those past events 
and process, on the basis of midrange theory (Currie & Killin forthcoming). 
Successful trace-based reasoners keep multiple plates spinning simultaneously. The history of 
the trace as a trace—its extraction, preparation and so forth—matters for what it can evidence, 
and the stability of midrange theory connecting the trace to the past is critical. In utilizing sets of 
traces, individual similarities and differences matter. Single trace-sets are deployed and re-
deployed for different epistemic uses across time, as when the same set of Triceratops skulls 
were used to represent an ontogenetic sequences and a stratigraphic sequence. This all requires 
intimate knowledge of the specimens themselves, as well as rich theoretical understanding of 
how they could form. 
Like any induction, trace-based reasoning is vulnerable. Horner and his collaborators’ 
Triceratops skulls only included four infants. Given their fragility, it could have been that none 
fossilized, or were discovered, or survived to be discovered.  Further, given the small size of the 
sample, could those skulls be atypical? And given that the skulls are often incomplete, how 
confident should we be in their reconstruction? Evidence decays over time. Much is not 
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preserved at all, and specimen extraction is often destructive: removing a fossil from the ground, 
and preparing it, almost inevitably involves information-loss. Further—as we’ve discussed—
trace-based reasoning relies on understanding how the present is shaped by the past. But in 
many ways the past isn’t like the present. Recall: the most closely related living animals to 
Triceratops are birds and crocodiles, and the largest mammals likely differ in many ways from 
dinosaurs. So, what analogies should we use to model dinosaur development? Crocodilian, avian, 
or mammalian? These failures of uniformitarianism make justifying theories of dinosaur 
development tricky. 
We have, then, two sources of underdetermination: 
(1) Trace decay, 
(2) Failures of uniformitarianism. 
Related worries concern interpretation. With little constraint on how we interpret traces, 
“Xeroxing” could occur. Our interpretation of data is shaped by preconceptions. Xeroxing 
happens when those preconceptions lead us to interpret sets of traces similarly, creating the 
impression that those preconceptions are well founded—after all, they have so many instances! 
(Bell 2015). In Xeroxing, our preconceptions shape data, not vice-versa. If data is biased, dispersed 
and messy, we might expect our interpretive photocopier to reproduce traces in our 
preconception’s image, thus further reinforcing said preconceptions in an epistemically 
disastrous cycle. Further, our interpretations are likely to be sensitive to a range of idiosyncratic 
factors: the training we’ve undergone, the research questions in mind, and perhaps even more 
personal features, as Joan Gero has put it: 
…our assessments of what is significant, what to record, our assigning of data to specific 
categories, our willingness or ability to make distinctions on any given day, these all vary 
tremendously from day to day, from mood to mood, from one knowledge state to 
another, even by a single investigator (2005, 318). 
So, there are many reasons to worry about the stability and licence of trace-based reasoning. 
When data sets are so impoverished, and so apparently hostage to the whim of our theoretical 
ideas and biases, what assurances can we have about past knowledge? 
Nonetheless, some philosophers are impressed by trace-based reasoning: by how often 
Xeroxing is avoided, underdetermination is overcome, and interpretation is well-grounded, often 
on the basis of very minimal traces. Horner and Goodwin’s analysis of Triceratops skulls included 
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only four incomplete infant skulls, preciously few! There are more extreme examples: only a few 
scraps of bone (initially a single finger bone) revealed an entirely new species of hominids living 
contemporaneously with (and likely interbreeding with) H. sapiens and Neanderthal: The 
Devisonians (Krause et al 2010). I’ve elsewhere discussed how a single molar was sufficient to 
identify a new species of long-extinct platypus (Currie 2018). How could so few fossils make such 
a difference? Traces appear to be unreasonably effective: given the challenges from 
underdetermination and interpretation, they shouldn’t be so powerful. As Bob Chapman and 
Alison Wylie have put it, 
… how stubbornly recalcitrant these data can be, no matter how entrenched their 
assumed meaning... (Chapman & Wylie 2016, 5) 
What do I mean by ‘unreasonable effectiveness’? The turn of phrase is owed to the physicist 
Eugene Wigner who, in a 1959 lecture, remarked on the surprising capacity of mathematics to 
capture the physical world: 
[I]t is important to point out that the mathematical formulation of the physicist's often 
crude experience leads in an uncanny number of cases to an amazingly accurate 
description of a large class of phenomena…The miracle of the appropriateness of the 
language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift 
which we neither understand nor deserve. (Wigner 1960, 8 - 14) 
If mathematics is a purely formal, made-up language, why should it so successfully capture 
the world ‘out there’? Something’s unreasonable effectiveness suggests that we have either 
misconceived it or its success. For instance, some argue from mathematics’ unreasonable 
effectiveness to forms of mathematical realism, while others have argued that mathematical 
powers in the natural sciences says more about our own psychology than math or nature 
(Colyvan 2015). If traces are unreasonably effective, then either we have made a mistake 
analysing the nature of trace-based reasoning, or got carried away in characterizing their success. 
Alison Wylie (particularly in her collaboration with Chapman) understands the power of 
traces in terms of the flexibility and ‘non-fundamental’ nature of archaeological reasoning (Wylie 
1999, 2011, Chapman & Wylie 2016). The idea that scientific theories are organized into 
hierarchical systems of dependence is baked into many conceptions of science: a bedrock of 
theory forms the stable foundation of our knowledge. On this approach we model scientific 
testing as involving, say, deductive relationships between theories and observations, where the 
theories are hierarchically organized (Oppenheim & Putnam 1958). However, historical scientists 
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adopt varying strategies to accommodate, mitigate and overcome the various kinds epistemic 
worries issues listed above, and these strategies are highly tailored to the specifics of the task, 
typically involving highly local, often tacit knowledge. Consider this discussion of fieldwork from 
Leakey & Lewin: 
A fossil hunter needs sharp eyes and a keen search image, a mental template that 
subconsciously evaluates everything he sees in his search for telltale clues. A kind of 
mental radar works even if he isn’t concentrating hard. A fossil mollusk expert has a 
mollusk search image. A fossil antelope expert has an antelope search image. … Yet even 
when one has a good internal radar, the search is incredibly more difficult than it sounds. 
Not only are fossils often the same color as the rocks among which they are found, so 
they blend in with the background; they are also usually broken into odd-shaped 
fragments. … In our business, we don’t expect to find a whole skull lying on the surface 
staring up at us. The typical find is a small piece of petrified bone. The fossil hunter’s 
search therefore has to have an infinite number of dimensions, matching every 
conceivable angle of every shape of fragment of every bone on the human body. (Leakey 
& Lewin 1992, 26) 
Fossilhounds utilize bountiful theory-mediated expertise. They look for surprising, new, or 
unexpected fossils, often employing well-developed theories of best practice and techniques for 
searching and extracting in the field. Similar can be said for fossil preparation, as Caitlin Wylie 
puts it: 
…preparators present their work and their role as skilful, individualized, and 
irreplaceable… each preparator’s artistic skill, aesthetic judgement, and creative 
problem-solving about prepared specimens’ appearance [makes a difference to the end 
product] and thus scientific interpretation, (2015, 52). 
These skilful, partially autonomous knowledge producing activities might form chains of 
inference, but their links are not purely logical, hierarchical relationships. Further, even with good 
specimens, palaeontologists still need to discover patterns across those specimens and try to 
explain and understand the data (Alisa Bokulich forthcoming, for instance, discusses the nuanced 
modelling involved in inferring from the fossil record to biodiversity’s deep past).  
Trace-based reasoning—inferring from remains to their past causes via midrange theory—is 
then an important part of understanding historical evidence, but is nonetheless misleading. It 
makes historical inference appear simple. It obscures the complexity of fieldwork, preparation, 
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storage and analysis on the one hand, and de-emphasizes other routes to uncovering the past on 
the other hand (I discuss this latter point in great detail elsewhere, see Currie 2018 chapters 6 to 
10, also Turner 2013). Chapman and Wylie deny that archaeology has foundations in the sense of a 
‘theoretical bedrock’, and I think this holds for historical science more generally. This lack of 
foundation enables historical scientists to exploit different kinds of relationships between their 
evidence. For Wylie, historical science is neither generally unified nor disunified, but is instead a 
patchwork of local integration and independence. And it is these local independencies and 
interdependencies that explain its success (Wylie 1999). 
When I say historical knowledge is local, then, I have three things in mind. First, the scope of 
the knowledge is often highly specific. Although historical scientists make use of quite general 
ideas—how stratigraphic layers form, the relationship between histological patterns and 
ontogenetic growth—the application of these ideas requires close attention to the specificities 
of the traces, the context of their discovery and preparation, and so forth. General tools are not 
simply applied to the case at hand, but fine-tuned and adapted to that local context. Second, the 
knowledge is often tacit, skilled know-how. As I’ll discuss below, the kind of knowledge we saw 
in fieldwork and fossil preparation also looms large for other aspects of science like theorizing 
and reasoning as well. Third, the dependencies between knowledge—the chains of inference and 
justification—are not hierarchically organized, but are a mosaic of interdependencies. It might be 
tempting to think of more general ideas like stratigraphy as forming the ‘base’ of historical 
knowledge. However, as the knowledge’s applicability relies on highly detailed understanding of 
the specific context, the relation is better understood as one of interdependence. 
The power of traces to upset deep-seated preconceptions, then, is partly explained by our 
expectations not being so deep-seated after all. There is no hierarchy of theories determining 
interpretation, knowledge is local. My notion of a ‘methodological omnivore’ (Currie 2015, 2018) 
attempts to capture a similar idea (see also Bonnin forthcoming). This focus on local patterns of 
justification and reasoning should lead us to change our perspective vis-à-vis the effectiveness of 
traces. Traces are not more effective than they ought to be, but their epistemic power is best 
understood at a more fine-grained level than philosophers are used to. It may be surprising that a 
few scraps of Denisovan bone could be sufficient to establish a whole new human species, but 
focusing on those scraps obscures the rich background knowledge that goes into supporting and 
developing the trace-based inference. It is against the backdrop of hard-won knowledge 
concerning both how to access, treat and analyse genomic data (including the long road to 
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workable ancient DNA analysis, Jones forthcoming), and our knowledge of both H. sapiens and 
Neanderthal genomic sequences, that the traces are utilized so effectively. As Wylie has put it, 
…on the model of evidential reasoning I have outlined here, much of the action is off-
stage. It is at least as crucial to establish the security and relevance of a robust body of 
background knowledge… as it is to work in the foreground, recovering and recording the 
material record that survives of an archaeological subject (Wylie 2011, 339)  
The unreasonable effectiveness of traces is an illusion due to an over-abstract approach to 
thinking about evidence: simple models of trace-based reasoning. The layers of interpretation 
taking us from field-work, to fossil preparation, to analysis, to publication, is where the epistemic 
action lies. Traces are not unreasonably effective. They are exactly as effective as our knowledge 
allows them to be. This doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t be (as I am) surprised and delighted by 
the creativity and ingenuity with which historical scientists uncover the past, but rather that we 
shouldn’t think there is any great mystery concerning their success. 
1.4 Experiments and History 
A common way of understanding historical science is via comparison with experimental 
science: intervening on isolated systems to establish causal relations and test hypotheses. In this 
section I’ll compare trace-based reasoning to experimentation, arguing that history (in the sense 
of having a past) matters as much for the latter as for the former.  
Philosophers have said a lot about experiments (certainly more than about trace-based 
reasoning!). Construing experiments as narrowly in the business of testing theories is a mistake. 
Experiments form empirical traditions that are often autonomous from scientific theories—they 
have a ‘life of their own’ (Hacking 1983). Experiments are often exploratory, attempting to 
discover new phenomena, characterize particular systems, and generate surprise (Franklin-Hall 
2005, Parke 2014, Currie 2018b, Morgan 2005). Some philosophers want to equate 
experimentation with models and simulations (Maki 2005), while others keep them apart (Currie 
& Levy forthcoming). Some think experimentation is a privileged route to knowledge, while 
others don’t (Parke 2014). Regarding historical science, Carol Cleland argues that experiments 
and trace-based reasoning are two different, and equally legitimate, ways of generating 
knowledge. Derek Turner sees experimental knowledge as privileged: after all, the 
experimentalist may generate replicated, carefully controlled tests on their subjects; they can 
‘make their own luck’, whereas the historical scientist’s epistemic fate is beholden to the survival 
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of traces. Ben Jeffares (2008) points out that establishing midrange theory often involves 
experimentation, thus blurring the lines between experimental and historical science. I’ve argued 
that although historical scientists often can’t perform experiments, they have ways of mitigating 
this, moving beyond trace evidence in various ways (Currie 2018). 
So, there’s plenty of philosophical wrangling to be had concerning what experiments are, 
their purpose, and how they compare to historical reconstruction. Here, I’ll argue that just as for 
traces being evidence requires knowledge of the processes which form them, so too do the 
results of experiments require mediating knowledge concerning the past of the experimental 
data in question. I’ll make three related claims. First, arguments that experimentalists (as 
opposed to trace-based-reasoners) can generally ‘control their own fates’ lean on some 
unlicensed idealization, ignoring the constraints on experimentation as practiced. Second, it is 
not a subject’s being in the past that makes it inaccessible to experiment per se. Third, all 
evidence—including experimental evidence—is historical in the minimal sense that all inductive 
inferences require knowledge of the relevant data’s past. 
These three points lead to the conclusion that whatever the limits of trace-based reasoning 
and experimentation might be, a target’s being in the past does not make a unique systematic 
epistemic difference. Let’s start by characterizing experiments, focusing for simplicity on those 
aiming to test hypotheses. 
The systems experimental scientists explore, from high-energy physics to developmental 
genetics to psychology, employ highly artificial systems bearing only a passing resemblance to 
the whirling dervish that is nature. Presumably, then, not just any concrete intervention counts as 
an experiment (or a successful one), but those where the concrete set up—the experimental 
system—bears the right kind of relationship to the relevant hypotheses. One view is that the 
subject of the experiment and the subject of the hypothesis should be the ‘same kind of thing’. 
Some philosophers have emphasized that experimental scientists, in performing their 
experiments, bring part of the world into the lab: “experiments are versions of the real world 
captured within an artificial laboratory environment” (Morgan 2005, 317, Guala 2002). This 
matters because if the experiment is to test a hypothesis, where that hypothesis is a 
generalization about the natural world, then the object of the experiment should fall within the 
scope of that generalization (Arnon Levy and myself attempt a nuanced view on this, Currie & 
Levy forthcoming).  
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Carol Cleland’s notion of experimentation is tied to testing general regularities. An 
experiment is a concrete setup of test conditions relevant to a theory or hypothesis. An 
experimental result will either accord with the hypothesis, and thus be confirmatory, or fail to—
thus falsifying the hypothesis. However, the results might only seem to confirm or disconfirm, 
when in reality some mistake in the experiment’s design, some hidden variable, or a fluky result, 
is to blame. So, experimenters repeat their procedures, varying conditions to control for these 
confounders—false positives for apparently confirmatory evidence and false negatives for 
apparently falsifying evidence. The experimenter, then (1) is testing some general theory via the 
results of a controlled physical intervention, and (2) performs repeated, varied interventions to 
ensure a match between the result and the theory the experiment is intended to test (Cleland 
2002), based on the discussion above, we might add: (3) the success of the experiment turns in 
part on the right kind of relationship holding between the experimental system and the natural 
system the hypothesis concerns. 
We have a potential reason to draw apart experiments and history. Perhaps because objects 
in the past cannot be the subject of replicable experiments, there is a gap between the 
experimental and the historical. As Cleland says, 
… without the ability to manipulate suspect conditions, one is at the mercy of 
what nature just happens to leave in her wake; sometimes she is generous and 
sometimes she is stingy, but the bottom line is that you can’t fool with her 
(Cleland 2002, 485). 
I think Cleland is right that many investigators are, as it were, at nature’s mercy—unable to 
use experiments to ‘make their own luck’. However, this situation is not due to the target’s being 
in the past. Sciences which concern currently existing systems are also sometimes denied the 
boon of experimentation.  
Many sciences study systems which operate at scales which make experimentation difficult, 
of lesser use, or practically impossible. Economics, astrophysics and climate science are some 
examples. Ecology is another. Ecologists are in the business of understanding the dynamics of 
species assemblages: predator and prey, mutualisms, producers and consumers, how energy 
flows through ecosystems. Although ecologists can perform lab-based experiments on 
‘microcosms’ of ecosystems (and, as with historical science, there is plenty of lab-work involved, 
Currie forthcoming, Odenbaugh 2006) and can perform limited field experiments (Millstein 
forthcoming), these activities differ from repeatedly intervening on an experimental system 
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which some general theory about the world bares on. This is due to scale and complexity: 
ecosystems are simply ‘too large’ for us to meaningfully control, reproduce, and (as it were) be 
bought into the lab. 
You might complain that experiments are beyond ecology in practice—due to mundane 
reasons like a lack of engineering power and know-how, or a lack of time and resources—while 
historical scientists cannot experiment in principle because their targets are in the past. I’m not 
convinced. First, these mundane ‘in practice’ constraints matter critically to knowledge 
production. Lab-based experimentation is often expensive, requires diversely skilled people, and 
can be frustratingly difficult. Moreover, experimenters rely on a community recognising and 
enforcing best practices and other norms, as well as institutions enabling dissemination and 
funding. Repeatability is not so immediately or simply achievable, then. Second, I suspect there is 
a double-standard regarding how we conceive of experimental and historical cases. If in 
considering ecology we are allowed to ignore ‘in practice’ constraints, then we ought to do the 
same for historical science. Removing such constraints, it seems to me, would enable historical 
scientists to perform many experiments. If there are relevant examples of targets still present, or 
manufacturable (and remember, we’re talking ‘in principle’ here!), then it seems we could expect 
experimental reach. Where we cannot experiment on non-avian dinosaurs, this isn’t because 
particular subjects are in the past, but because the whole category is in the past. As we’ve seen, a 
major challenge for dinosaur paleontology, not faced by mammal or bird paleontology, is the lack 
of any tokens of that type being around now. It is the capacity to be replicated that matters here, 
and things in the past can often be replicated. Even if it is right that targets in the past—where 
the whole category is in the past—are unable to be replicated, in practice this is simply one way 
that experimental access is limited, along with issues of scale, uniqueness, and the distribution of 
tokens. And further this assumes we are unable to manufacture targets.  
And so, I suspect there is a distinction to be had—rough-hewn and idealized, to be sure—
between experimental and non-experimental science. Experimental sciences are able to 
repeatedly manipulate the objects about which their hypotheses refer and this brings a suite of 
epistemic benefits and challenges. Other sciences have to rely on data gathering, proxy 
investigations, and other approaches. But this distinction does not track history and non-history. 
Let’s now turn to a similarity between experiment and history. 
Wylie’s insight about historical inference is that to understand the power of traces, we 
mustn’t abstract too far from the local processes and practices warranting their evidential use. 
The stability of historical inference is granted not by some fundamental grounding, nor by purely 
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logical argument, but by the complex, often messy and diverse practices of generating, curating 
and deploying traces as evidence. Presumably experiment should be treated with the same 
courtesy, as Sabina Leonelli has recently (Leonelli 2016, forthcoming). 
Most philosophical analysis of evidence is synchronic, that is, we consider evidential reasoning 
while ignoring temporal aspects: experiments generate evidence which test hypotheses, and we 
employ an atemporal model to understand their relationship. Such models often encourage 
philosophers to consider the hypothesis and evidence abstracted from the conditions of their 
generation. But Leonelli urges that understanding evidential reasoning and support requires a 
diachronic perspective. Experiments generate a set of results, which are recorded, transformed, 
stored, data-based, analysed and occasionally deployed as evidence. And that temporal process 
(that recording, transforming, storing, data-basing, analysing) matters for the warrant of 
evidential claims formed on the basis of that data. Provenance always matters. 
Leonelli distinguishes between data and evidence (Leonelli 2016). ‘Data’ are the result of 
some process of generation: an experiment is run, a fossil prepared, etc… Data go on journeys: 
they are curated, transformed, de-contextualized from the instance of their creation to be placed 
in tables, recorded in data bases, and so forth. Sometimes, data is deployed as evidence—playing 
a role in supporting some claim. Data are, in part, potential evidence. As such, their provenance, 
their past, matters critically. The importance of provenance is unmissable when considering 
trace-based reasoning. Traces are the remains of long-ago processes, entities and events. They 
have been transformed over time: by geology most obviously, but also in the often destructive 
processes of fieldwork, preparation and storage necessary for those traces to be deployed. In 
considering traces, the trace’s past—its status as data—is immediately called to mind. 
Provenance matters critically for experiments too. Experiments generate data—recordings, 
results—which are then deployed. Sometimes the temporal distance between generation and 
deployment is long indeed. And sometimes the same data might be deployed in many different 
ways. This is most obvious in ‘big data’ science, where large amounts of information is stored and 
categorized in data bases, to be deployed via statistical analysis to a plethora of cases (Leonelli 
2016). However, it is also a more-or-less ubiquitous feature of successful science. Studies 
themselves will be reused as citations, in meta-analyses, and for journalistic reporting. In each of 
these cases where the data comes from, its provenance, partly warrants its use as evidence. As 
Leonelli puts it, “Data are defined by their temporal characteristics as much as by their spatial and 
morphological ones, and underestimating the challenges and timescales involved in data 
processing can disrupt inferential reasoning and invalidate the use of data as evidence”. 
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Here’s the lesson we should draw from Leonelli: experimental results (data) are traces of past 
experiments. When we deploy experimental data to make claims about phenomena, we 
inevitably make a trace-based inference to the stability, validity (and so on) of the evidence’s 
source and its subsequent journey. In this weak sense, history always matters: distinguishing 
between the experimental and the historical by claiming that experiments’ repeatability allows 
them to escape history fails. You might insist that nonetheless repeatability grants experimental 
scientists advantages, however—again—the repeatability of experiments might be over-
emphasized by adopting a too-ideal perspective. As I’ve mentioned, experiments are often 
costly, hard to run, require significant expertise, and so on. As Leonelli puts it,  
experimental results are difficult to control – not only at the point at which they are 
produced, but most significantly at the point of dissemination, storage, and re-use. Data 
can disappear or become unusable very quickly if not properly curated: it only takes a 
destroyed hard disk, a misleading annotation or a postdoc changing jobs. Worries about 
differential survival of evidence and informational destruction are thus arguably as alive 
with contemporary data collection in the life sciences as they are for historical sciences 
and observational data therein. 
 
Even if experimental data may be repeatedly generated in principle, in practice it often is not. 
And by contrast some evidence of the deep past is truly bountiful (consider the big bang’s 
background radiation). It seems to me that the epistemic variability within experimental science, 
and within historical science, is greater than the variability between experimental and historical 
science. As such, it is unclear whether comparing them in this way is particularly enlightening. 
Doing so requires abstracting away from the local context which I’ve argued is necessary for 
understanding the warrant of that reasoning in the first place. You might further object that 
historical and experimental data come apart insofar as in the former we care about traces in 
terms of their natural formation (how bone becomes fossil, for instance), while in 
experimentation we care about the specimen’s history post-experiment. However, employing 
experimental evidence requires intimate knowledge of the context in which the data was 
generated, just as employing traces needs knowledge of the natural conditions which generated 
them. Other than issues of repeatability (which we’ve already covered), I don’t see how appeal to 
‘natural’ verses ‘artificial’ generation draws apart the role of the past in historical but not 
experimental reasoning. 
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We have, then, a sense in which history matters for evidential reasoning in science. When 
data is deployed to form an evidential claim, where the data came from, how it was produced for 
instance, matters. We missed this because of an overly ideal approach to thinking about 
evidence. Evidential reasoning is historical reasoning. However, the sense of ‘historical reasoning’ 
here is shallow: It simply means having a past. Historians and historical scientists often mean 
something richer than this: the things which they seek to understand are somehow especially 
historical. Grappling with such ideas is the aim of the next two parts.  
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Part 2: The Nature of the Deep Past 
What is the nature of history and the deep past, and what difference might this make to our 
knowledge of it? As we’ve seen, Carol Cleland takes paradigm historical inferences to target 
token events, while experimental methods concern regularities, generalities and ‘laws’. Her view 
echoes an older contrast between ‘nomothetic’ and ‘idiographic’ routes to knowledge. I’ll start 
by asking whether historical science should be characterized in idiographic terms, as Cleland 
recommends. Answer? No: as we’ll see, nomothetic and idiographic understanding are deeply 
intertwined—you don’t get one without the other. However, this epistemic point leads to an 
ontological discussion: I’ll highlight how some historical processes generate, surprising, specific 
and messy kinds; history often generates what I’ll call peculiarity. This will set us up for part 3, and 
our examination of historical explanation. To get there, I’ll consider Collingwood’s idea that 
history ‘generates new forms’, cash this out via a brief discussion of historical kinds, and then 
introduce peculiarity. 
2.1 Idiographic and Nomothetic 
The 19th Century philosopher Wilhelm Windelband introduced the terms idiographic and 
nomothetic to distinguish two routes to knowledge. An idiographic investigation takes the target 
on its own terms—it is treated as unique and its individual history is traced and narrativized. 
Think autobiography. A nomothetic investigation treats its target as a token of a type or an 
instantiation of a kind. Think particles acting in accordance with laws. In 1980 Stephen Jay Gould 
implied the distinction while discussing what would eventually be known as ‘the paleobiological 
revolution’. 
Paleontology is, in large part, a historical discipline charged with documenting the 
irreversible and unrepeatable events of life’s history… We care very much that 
Neotrigonia lacks (except in its larval shell) the discrepant ornament that characterizes 
most mesozoic trigonians. The splinter that retarded the ball rolling down this particular 
inclined plane is merely a nuisance (Gould 1980, 98). 
Gould compares palaeontologists (who care about the particular morphology of extinct 
clams like Neotrigonia) and physicists (who care about how balls might roll down inclined planes). 
The former is interested in unique, often contingent events. As such, they emphasize features 
which make their target different. The latter is not interested in how a particular ball might find 
its way down a plane, but in the rules by which all ball-like objects behave. That is, laws. Another 
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way of dividing idiographic from nomothetic, then, is simply to say that the nomothetic 
investigations care about and utilize laws of nature, while idiographic investigations don’t. 
So, do laws make the difference between historical and non-historical knowledge? Laws, I 
take it, are regularities, but not all regularities are laws. Laws are non-accidental regularities. By 
‘regularity’, I just mean an event’s recurrence.  An accidental regularity is one which holds, but in a 
fragile way: it just so happens to hold, due to a fluke. Non-accidental regularities, by contrast, 
occur for a reason. The rules of taphonomy (the science of fossilization) are not accidental. That, 
for instance, hard-bodied animals are more likely to fossilize is due to the nature of fossilization. 
Because fossilization requires organisms maintain morphological integrity under pressure, 
squishier organisms are less likely to leave a mark on the fossil record. The bias towards hard-
bodies critters isn’t some fluke. 
Why are non-accidental regularities important? Explanations often concern themselves with 
how things would have been different. Had the continents of the mid-Cretaceous not broken up, 
then perhaps the mid-Cretaceous revolution would not have occurred, say. As I’ll suggest below, 
explanations explain by situating their targets in various ways—and often they are situated 
within spaces of possibility. Explanations show that had different conditions obtained, then a 
different result would have occurred. Non-accidental regularities are stable enough to support 
such counterfactuals: they thus tell us what would have happened otherwise. On this approach, 
laws make scientific explanation possible. Further, much scientific knowledge is based on 
induction: a set of cases are examined, and we extrapolate to the general class. Schott et al 
suggest that their study of two Pachycephalosaur species (or just one, if their ontogenetic 
hypothesis is right) gives reason to think that Pachycephalosaurs (or even dinosaurs) generally 
underwent surprising ontogenetic changes. Inductions take us from individuals to patterns. 
However, if the patterns are merely accidental—just happen to hold—then establishing the 
pattern in one set of cases is less likely to secure their occurrence in further cases. If the 
regularity isn’t accidental, then inductive inferences are supported. Presumably regularities 
support counterfactuals and inductions when there is some underlying reason for the regularity 
to hold. Dinosaurs shared developmental mechanisms, and it is these mechanisms which enable 
more-or-less extreme changes during ontogeny. This thought partly warrants Schott et al’s 
inductive inference.  
Understood as non-accidental regularities, laws play a role in any science. Laws, and 
theorizing about laws, set our expectations about what will occur, thus defining what is 
surprising, and making some forms of explanation possible. Some accounts of laws go further, 
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claiming that laws tell us how things must be: describing necessities (Armstrong 1983). But the 
cases driving our reflections thus far include examples of non-accidental regularities that hold 
under restricted conditions (sometimes called ‘ceteris paribus’) and there are often exceptions 
within those conditions (Mitchell 1997). Normally hard-bodied critters are more likely to be 
fossilized than squishy critters. However, this trend may be bucked. The famous Burgess Shale 
biota date to the Cambrian (around 509 million years ago) and contain bountiful, diverse soft-
bodied organisms (my favourite being the 5-eyed, claw-at-the-end-of-a-trunk Opabinia). Such 
assemblages are more common than we might expect, roughly forty locations being known 
(Gais, Briggs & Yuanlong 2010). These formations occur via a different-than-usual process of 
fossilization (although which processes is still debated). Regardless, the ‘hard-bodied-bias’ in the 
fossil record is a non-accidental regularity (there is a good reason for it) despite having both 
systematic exceptions (when the underlying conditions are different) and particular, fluky 
exceptions where soft-bodied organisms get lucky in the fossilization lottery. This doesn’t stop 
regularities from supporting counterfactuals or inductive generalizations, so I’m happy to 
consider them as of a class with full-blown, necessary laws. I don’t think there is a clear-cut 
answer as to how reliable a regularity must be to count as a law: I suspect this will depend on 
context. 
With this account of ‘regularity’ on the table, we can reframe the nomothetic versus 
idiographic dichotomy. A nomothetic science is primarily interested in understanding regularities, 
while an idiographic science is interested in explaining particular events. Some philosophers have 
suggested historical science is idiographic in this sense. Take Carol Cleland: 
… the hypotheses of prototypical historical science differs from those of classical 
experimental science insofar as they are concerned with event-tokens instead of 
regularities among event-types (480, 2002). 
On this view, the main target of historical science are singular events in our world’s particular 
history. Ben Jeffares (2008) responds: “… the historical sciences are as interested in 
understanding the general causal structure of the world as much as any other branch of science” 
(Jeffares 2008, 475). Jeffares’ argument focuses on midrange theories. As he points out, such 
theories just are regularities—they are nomothetic. Fossilization is not a particular event, but an 
event-type (in fact a set of event-types). As such, paleontologists studying taphonomy just are 
concerned with ‘regularities among event-types’. 
Cleland is dismissive: 
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… generalizations of this sort play a secondary role in historical research. They are not 
the targets of historical research but rather useful tools borrowed from other disciplines 
for special purposes (Cleland 2011, 566) 
This looks like an impasse: Jeffares (also Turner 2013, Currie 2018 chapter 7) points out that 
regularities play a role in historical science, but Cleland relegates them to supporting roles, mere 
handmaidens to the real business of uncovering the past. How can we adjudicate? I think 
historical scientists are interested in both the idiographic and the nomothetic. This is because the 
general and the particular are not separate in practice. To understand the particular, we need to 
think of them as (at least partially) partaking in, and being shaped by, regularities; in 
understanding particulars we learn about regularities.  
Recall Schott et al’s analysis of the Pachycephalosaur Stegocera validum. Although their work 
explicitly targets patterns of ontogeny in Pachycephalosaur, they focus on a careful analysis of 
two species. Indeed, their work was motivated by Goodwin et al’s analysis of a single specimen. 
Goodwin et al (1998), examining a single skull, noticed it was marked by highly vascularized and 
‘fast’ growth patterns—suggesting that the dome grew later in ontogeny. As we’ve seen, Schott 
et al examine a larger data-set from multiple empirical perspectives while connecting their results 
to more general pictures of dinosaur diversity and ontogeny. They consider the idiographic and 
nomothetic together. In Schott et al’s concluding discussion, they start with a lesson about the 
ontogeny of the Pachycepholosaur species they examine, and its relationship with one other 
putative species: 
[we have shown] that as Stegoceras matured, the skull changed shape dramatically, and 
demonstrates conclusively that Ornatotholus browni represents a transient ontogenetic 
stage of S. validum (19) 
They then link this discussion with the relationship between domed and flat-headed 
Pacyhcephalosaur generally: 
The extensive nature of these changes is such that juveniles and adults differ radically in 
their general appearance, and we hypothesize that this model of dome growth is a 
common developmental trajectory of domed Pachycephalosaurs (20) 
Which is itself linked to yet broader discussions about ontogeny in some late-Cretaceous 
dinosaurs: 
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The phenomenon of extreme morphological differences between juveniles and adults is 
becoming increasingly well-documented in ornithischian dinosaurs, including Hadrosaurs 
and ceratopsids (20). 
Which matters—as we’ve seen—for explaining the possibly inflated biodiversity of the 
Cretaceous: 
Historically, these transitional juvenile morphologies have been erected as distinct taxa, 
resulting in artificially inflated estimates of biodiversity in these groups (20). 
Estimates of biodiversity in late-Cretaceous dinosaurs are surprising in virtue of our general 
expectations about biodiversity in large-body critters, themselves grounded in examinations of 
biodiversity across a range of taxa. The nomothetic (vertebrate herbivores fall within particular 
ranges of biodiversity) and the idiographic (Ornatotholus browni are infant Stegoceras validum) 
are intimately related: you don’t get one without the other. Notice the iterativity of the research. 
Theoretically motivated expectations about biodiversity motivate new field research, the results 
of which underwrite new reconstructions of the particular lineages of the late Cretaceous, which 
are themselves informed by, and fuel for, new sets of expectations about biodiversity. Models of 
regularities are clarified and honed by interactions with particular cases.  
The nomothetic sets research direction (general concerns about dinosaur ontogeny 
motivated Horner & Goodwin’s fieldwork); by generating puzzles, the nomothetic sets what is 
significant about cases (dinosaur biodiversity in the late-Cretaceous is odd given general patterns 
in biodiversity); the nomothetic influences how traces are interpreted (theories of dinosaur 
ontogeny help determine when to classify specimens as different species or different growth-
stages);  the nomothetic provides grounds for linking or associating cases (theories of dinosaur 
phylogeny highlight the continuities between Pachycephalosaur and Triceratops). The idiographic 
provides empirical support and tests for theories (Horner & Goodwin’s Triceratops analysis 
suggests that dinosaurs had unusual ontogenies); the idiographic inspires hypotheses (Goodwin 
et al’s analysis of a single specimen suggested that flat-headed Pachycephalosaur represented an 
early developmental stage); the idiographic provides concrete examples of what would 
otherwise be merely abstract and theoretical (Horner & Goodwin’s ontogenetic sequence is a 
striking example of an unusual ontogeny); the idiographic generates surprises (why would the 
emergence of flowering plants have such a profound effect?). 
The historical sciences are both nomothetic and idiographic. And surely so are most sciences. 
But this is not the end of the story. Although historical sciences care about regularities, perhaps 
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they are regularities of a different sort to those other scientists care about. That is, perhaps the 
nature of history is such that regularities take a particular form. Before considering this 
possibility, a brief digression is required. 
2.2 A historiographical tangent 
A view about the relationship between history and science clamours for attention. Adrian! 
(the thought goes) you’ve made a fundamental error by lumping history together with natural 
sciences. Human history is special because it has humans in it: intentional beings. History really 
matters when it is human history.  
The clearest exponent of such a perspective is Collingwood (1976/1936, see also White 1976): 
“so far as our scientific and historical knowledge goes, the processes of events which constitute 
the world of nature are altogether different in kind from the processes of thought which 
constitute the world of history” (170). Why draw so sharp a boundary between processes of 
nature and processes of history?  
Collingwood considers two ways of undermining analogies between natural science and 
human history. First, he points out that historical kinds are not eternal, but emerge over history: 
Change and history are not at all the same. According to this old-established conception, 
the specific forms of natural things constitute a changeless repertory of fixed types, and 
the process of nature is a process by which instances of these forms… come into 
existence and pass out of it again… Now in human affairs… there is no such fixed 
repertory of specific forms. Here the process of becoming was already by that time 
recognised as involving not only the instances or quasi-instances of the forms, but the 
forms themselves (166). 
The idea is this: in the natural world, fixed forms are sometimes instantiated, sometimes not; 
in the world of history, the forms themselves arise. Sometimes a single hydrogen and two oxygen 
molecules form a chemical bond and become water, and then sometimes that bond is broken. 
But this is merely change, not history. Historical change involves new forms arising. Human 
institutions do not exist time immemorial merely to be instantiated, but are created in particular 
times and places. The European Union was not merely instantiated, but was founded with the 
signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. And the particular shape, properties—and fate—of that 
institution is intimately linked to those historical conditions. 
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However, Collingwood points out that this cannot divide nature from history, because sciences 
like biology and geology have new forms a’plenty. ‘Pachycephalosaur’ is no occasionally instantiated 
eternal kind. It was a new form, arising in the revolutions of the mid-Cretaceous. In fact the whole 
natural world looks historical in this sense: “Today even the stars are divided into kinds which can be 
described as older and younger… the chemical composition of our present world is only a phase in a 
process leading from a very different past to a very different future” (167). 
So, what then is the difference between history and nature? Collingwood’s second pass places the 
difference in intentionality: 
The archaeologist’s use of his stratified relics depends on his conceiving them as artefacts 
serving human purposes and thus expressing a particular way in which men have thought 
about their own life; and from this point of view the palaeontologist, arranging his fossils in a 
time-series, is not working as an historian, but only as a scientist thinking in a way which can 
at most be described as quasi-historical (168). 
Unlike the scientist, the historian and archaeologist has to get into the mind of their subjects. 
Collingwood distinguishes between the ‘outside’: the world of events and causes, and the ‘inside’: the 
world of intentions, beliefs and desires. Approaching some event, the scientist links it to other events 
and laws: situating it (as I’ll say later) in the world’s causal flow. Approaching some event, the 
historian moves from the outside to the inside: to the intentions of the historical actors. How do 
historians do this? By applying their own agency to it, by “rethinking them in his own mind” (169). And 
this action of rethinking is central to the reflexive nature of historical practice: “The historian not only 
re-enacts past thought, he re-enacts it in the context of his own knowledge and therefore, in re-
enacting it, criticizes it, forms his own judgment of its value, corrects whatever errors he can discern 
in it” (169). In this sense, the process of history is a kind of dialogue between the historian and the 
past actors. 
I think Collingwood has insights concerning the value of history which I’ll return to in the 
conclusion. But, has Collingwood provided a convincing way of drawing the historian and scientist 
apart? In one sense, perhaps, but in another no. We should disambiguate two related claims in 
Collingwood: (1) history requires psychological explanation, (2) psychological explanations 
necessitate ‘re-enacting’. The first claim might well be true, but unless there is something special 
about psychological explanation, this doesn’t tell us anything about the relationship between history 
and knowledge. The second suggests what might be special about psychological explanations: they 
require the historian ‘rethinking’ the thoughts of past actors. But I think this underemphasizes the 
role ‘rethinking’ plays in natural science. 
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Science is not just about the external. To say it is suggests the totality of scientific knowledge is 
explicit and propositional—that scientific knowledge doesn’t involve ‘re-enacting’. I think this 
misconstrues some (if not all) scientific knowledge: there is good reason to see science as a tacit, 
skilled, communal, human endeavour. As this thought has a fair pedigree in philosophy of science, 
let’s take an idiosyncratic tour.  
We’ll start with Thomas Kuhn (1970) who I think gets it right when he emphasizes the importance 
of institutional pedagogy in shaping (and making possible) scientific knowledge (see also Polanyi 
1958): 
[scientific knowledge] is not acquired by exclusively verbal means. Rather it comes as one is 
given words together with concrete examples of how they function in use; nature and words 
are learned together… what results from this process is “tacit knowledge” which is learned 
by doing science rather than by acquiring rules for doing it. (Kuhn 1970, 191)  
The process of becoming a scientist involves acquiring a diverse range of knowledge, skills, 
behaviours and values. Vertebrate paleontologists know an enormous amount about animal anatomy; 
they know how to do productive fieldwork, they know how to use various experimental and statistical 
tools. In my experience paleontologists are excellent at detecting and processing visual information, 
presumably due to spending so long on fieldwork and identifying finer points of their chosen taxa’s 
anatomy. Vertebrate paleontologists have a sense of what are good questions and what are good 
answers in the context of their science. They have what Kirsten Walsh and I have called ‘explanatory 
expectations’ (Currie & Walsh forthcoming). That is, there are particular explanatory forms that they 
have learned to deem satisfying. Kuhn’s point is that this knowledge is not simply told, but is imparted 
and demonstrated in often tacit ways in lecture theatres, laboratories and in the field. Much of what it 
is to be a scientist is (1) tacit and (2) imparted through a range of formal and informal pedagogical 
processes.  
One way of capturing this aspect of Kuhn’s work is via Nancy Nersessian’s ‘mental models’. 
Nersessian aims to explain mechanisms of conceptual change (1999, 2007) by positing 
representations in scientists’ minds which act as a kind of frame through which their scientific 
work is done. 
Concepts provide a means through which humans make sense of the world. In 
categorizing experiences we sort phenomena, noting relationships, differences, and 
interconnections among them. A conceptual structure is a way of systematizing, of 
putting concepts in relation to one another in at least a semi - or locally - coherent 
manner. (Nersessian 2007, 126). 
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Because conceptual structures are large, complex—logical—beasts, scientists require mental 
models to understand them. These models are partial, good-enough-for-jazz representations of 
conceptual structures; they are incomplete and often non-explicit. Nersessian employs the notion 
of mental models to explain conceptual shifts in science. For our purposes, the point is that at 
least some scientific knowledge is constituted by partial, incomplete, often idiosyncratic 
representations which scientists use to make sense of theories and engage in collaborative work. 
Although the target is not typically imagined as literally intentional, I think the internal know-how 
of Nerssesian’s mental models bear a striking resemblance to Collingwood’s re-enacting. Both 
involve employing internal, often tacit, cognitive tools to get a grip on some phenomena of 
interest. 
This tradition of emphasizing the tacit in science has recently expanded to an emphasis on 
understanding as an epistemic good differing from explanation or truth. These approaches 
undermine Collingwood’s reliance on scientific knowledge being ‘external’ in the sense of being 
explicit. In one recent example, Angela Potochnik has argued that the ultimate aim of science is 
not explicitly truth, but rather ‘understanding’ (Potochnik 2016). For her, ‘understanding’ has two 
components: first, a ‘sufficiently true’ component: if I understand some aspect of the world I 
need not know it all that precisely or carefully, but I’d better get some things right; second, a 
psychological ‘grasping’ condition: the understander has to ‘get it’ in some way. She explains 
many aspects of scientific work, the ubiquity of idealization especially, by claiming that science 
isn’t after truth but is “responsible to and reflective of human particularities” (199). That is, our 
limited and idiosyncratic needs and interests as human knowers. Other philosophers have 
emphasized the roles various kinds of know-how and abilities play in science (Le Bihan 2016, 
Leonelli 2016). The more we humanize and socialize scientific knowledge—think of it is a product 
of the epistemic activities of social beings like us—the more we emphasize the non-explicit 
aspects of it and, I think, the less convincing we should find Collingwood’s attempt to split 
science and history in terms of method. 
Let’s return to Collingwood’s comparison of the archaeologist and the paleontologist. 
Although paleontological practice doesn’t rely on conceiving their materials as human artefacts, 
if the accounts of scientific knowledge we’ve considered are right—and I think they are—then 
scientific knowledge is highly internal, often involving ‘re-enactment’ (through something like 
Nersessian’s mental models) in the context of their own knowledge. There is plenty of the 
internal in science, then. You might insist that employing tacit resources to re-enact a 
psychological explanation is fundamentally different from using them to understand the 
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‘external’ events of scientific explanation, but this insistence needs backing up: in virtue of what, 
if not requiring re-enactment, might intentionality be a fundamentally different epistemic target? 
2.3 Kinds 
I think Collingwood got it wrong when he distinguished history (and archaeology) from 
natural science, but I think he had his finger on the button when he linked the emergence of ‘new 
forms’ to history. In the next two sections I aim to make sense of this idea. Most pressingly, what 
are we to make of Collingwood’s rather metaphysically weighty, Platonic sounding appeal to 
‘forms’? I think reflection on historical kindhood can provide a less off-putting (for those who are 
off-put!) account of what is being got at.  
There are many ways of carving up the world. We could do it via, say, height, or colour, or 
age, or mass, or alphabetically, and so on (ad infinitum). The notion of ‘kinds’ suggests that some 
ways of carving are special: they reflect some natural order, perhaps. At a first pass, the kinds 
that interest scientists—say, species or genes in biology, layers of strata in geology—seem less 
arbitrary than categories like ‘blue things’ or ‘things I like’. Analyses of ‘natural kinds’ often track 
this intuition (Hawley & Bird 2011). On some accounts, natural kinds pick out a privileged, 
hierarchical order: they ‘carve nature at the joints’. On another extreme, there is no real 
difference between kinds like ‘hydrogen’ and kinds like ‘things Adrian likes’: all categorizations 
are subjective and equally legitimate. I fall somewhere in between. Humans draw many 
categories, there are many different ‘kindings’ in our practices, and these categories often do 
important work for us. Paleontologists divide fossil specimens into morphotypes based on 
diagnostic features. They then consider further categorizations which explain these 
morphotypes: sometimes into phylogenetic groupings such as species or genera, sometimes into 
intra-lineage categories like sexes or different life-stages. And these kinds do work for us. The 
ancestral divisions of phylogenies, for instance, matter for determining biodiversity, which as 
we’ve seen itself feeds into an array of further questions. Dinosaur diversity at the end-
Cretaceous matters for understanding the K-Pg extinction event. Although many of these kinds 
are varyingly fuzzy—vagueness and ambiguity abound—I’m not inclined draw a strict distinction 
between ‘real’ kinds and those which scientists merely project. The world is a complex place, and 
I’d be astonished if some small, prearranged set of categories uniquely pick out its structures. 
Indeed, as we’ll see in the next section, some historical processes should lead us to expect a wide 
diversity of kinds. But this doesn’t mean that all kinds are equal: a kind’s legitimacy is founded in 
the work it does for us, and we can’t just force the world into whichever shape we want. 
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I think there is something to Collingwood’s idea that in history ‘new forms’—that is, new 
kinds—arise, whereas in other contexts there is a ‘changeless repository of fixed types’. We 
needn’t grant this difference too much metaphysical baggage, we can instead understand the 
difference in terms of different ways of kinding. 
Laura Franklin-Hall (in prep) has distinguished between three types of kinds, each differing in 
how they lump and split tokens. First, synchronic kinds, which we might align with Collingwood’s 
‘changeless fixed types’. These lump and split on the basis of the tokens sharing intrinsic—often 
essential—properties. Consider ‘hydrogen’. An atom is hydrogen just in case it has a single 
proton in its nucleus. I needn’t know anything about an atom’s history to classify it as hydrogen. 
Franklin-Hall’s next two kinds are both diachronic, where kind-membership depends in part on 
the token’s history. Second, then, we have type-historical kinds. These categorize objects in terms 
of the processes which produce them. To be a member of the kind, a certain type of history is 
required. Although geologists might identify, say, igneous rock using morphology, what the kind 
picks out (what makes igneous rock igneous) is being formed via volcanic processes: being the 
remains of cooled lava. Third, we have (a bit ironically) token-historical-kinds. These, in a sense, 
are not ‘kinds’ at all, but rather pick out particular sequences or objects across time. You likely 
consider yourself to be a token-historical-kind: different time-slices of Adrian are ‘Adrian’ in virtue 
of being the same token-historical kind. A common example from the philosophy of biology is 
‘species’: what makes you and I the same species is not our having the same set of essential 
properties (being ‘featherless bipeds’ perhaps), but that we are linked through ancestry (Hull 
1976). Species are not type-historical kinds but token-historical kinds. Species membership is 
decided on the basis of being part of the same token process. Being an igneous rock doesn’t 
depend on forming from lava from the same volcano: hardened lava from Martian volcanoes 
would still be igneous. Not so for species membership: if the featherless bipeds are not 
ancestrally linked, they ain’t the same species. 
I think Franklin-Hall’s distinction goes some way towards capturing Collingwood’s insight. 
Where scientists traditionally did their ‘kinding’ with synchronic, essential kinds—where forms 
are in some sense merely instantiated—they now tend to kind historically. They do this because 
as history progresses, new kinds arise: volcanoes are required for igneous rock, for instance, and 
the kind ‘igneous rock’ has a history linked to the emergence of volcanoes. 
Kindhood is nested and cross-cutting. Super-Paw is both a member of the token historical 
kind Felis catus, as he is of the Carnivora order and perhaps the synchronic kind terrestrial, night-
time predator and the type-historical kind living organism. Which kinds are ‘more legitimate’—
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where Super-Paw’s kind-joints are—strikes me as a less important question than noting that such 
diverse ways of kinding are an integral part of many scientific practices. In the next section, I’ll 
suggest an explanation for this diversity, and for the power of diachronic kinds in historical 
science and elsewhere: what I call history’s ‘peculiarity’. 
2.4 Peculiarity 
I’ve been trying to make sense of Collingwood’s idea that history creates new forms, which 
I’m understanding in terms of diachronic kinds. But why would attending to history lead to 
kinding in this way? Objects and processes have pasts: even if atoms may be categorized 
synchronically, individual atoms have pasts which might interest us. However, those pasts don’t 
appear to make a difference to what makes them atoms. When, then, does history matter for 
categorization, when do diachronic kinds come into their own? The remainder of this book is, in 
part, an argument that a feature of historical processes, their ‘peculiarity’, explains both the 
power of diachronic kinding and the prominence of narrative in historical disciplines. Why the 
term ‘peculiarity’? This is in part a matter of product differentiation; it is simply a label. What I 
mean by ‘peculiarity’ is precisely the definition I provide and unpack below. Hopefully more 
casual understandings of ‘peculiarity’ aren’t too offended by my term of art. 
 ‘Peculiarity’ is related to philosophical discussions about contingency. Historical 
investigations are often concerned with events which, in some suitably strong sense, could have 
been otherwise. The mid-Cretaceous revolution wasn’t the inevitable result of time’s pre-
determined unfolding; Pachycephalosaur headgear was the outcome of a specific, perhaps path-
dependent route through a bewildering possibility space. Collingwood’s idea that history 
generates new forms is related to historical contingency: in order for some things to happen, 
others must happen first (McConwell & Currie 2017, Beatty 2006, Ereshefsky 2014, Desjardins 
2014, Powell & Mariscal 2014). 
To develop my account, I’ll draw on recent discussions of contingency by Alison McConwell 
and Kim Sterelny. I’ll start with McConwell (forthcoming) who, building on John Beatty (1994), 
argues that contingency is generative. 
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Contingency, by causing diversity of a certain sort, results in a pluralism. Specifically, 
contingency causes structural varieties, which distinguish a plurality of types (McConwell 
forthcoming)3. 
Let’s unpack. We’ve seen many kinds of paleobiological diversity: in morphology, life-stages, 
phylogeny, biodiversity, and so on. In biology, there are many diversity concepts and measures 
(Maclauren & Sterelny 2008). McConwell adopts a pluralistic, interest-based conception of 
diversity. For her, determining “whether there is diversity or not will depend upon the 
measurement strategies and tools”. She focuses on ‘structural’ diversity, which is contrasted 
with ‘functional’ diversity. One might group together, say, deer antlers and Pachycephalosaur 
skulls as being sexually selected for male-male competition. But the two differ structurally: the 
male-male competition is instantiated in different ways. Structural description ranges from being 
very coarse-grained, such as the four-limbed bilateral symmetry of vertebrates or the 
organization of ecosystems, to finer-grained cellular and biomechanical analyses. 
McConwell’s view takes evolutionary contingency to be the tendency of evolutionary 
processes to lead to highly particular outcomes. That is, the outcomes of evolution are highly 
sensitive to initial conditions or path-dependent. She argues this feature leads to structural 
diversity. Evolutionary processes work on variation within populations: each individual’s 
developmental suite is a little different from their conspecifics’, and there is (sometimes 
bountiful) wiggle-room provisioned by plasticity and mutation. The range of actual and potential 
variation—which evolutionary paths are open and which are closed—are the product in part of 
these structural features, and are themselves the product of a long evolution. This, McConwell 
points out, leads to a more generative, path dependent conception of evolution. 
[O]ne can take this a step further: evolution is transformative, less optimal, and less 
constrained. (McConwell forthcoming) 
The breaking up of Gondwana likely set the stage for the modern world as new niches arose, 
and new critters evolved in response. By taking one path, some possibilities opened and others 
closed. Further, new trajectories were set: the insect-angiosperm alliance, and perhaps the 
eventual dinosaur extinction.  By generating diversity, contingency necessitates pluralistic—and 
historical—kinding. Historical-token and -type kinds are appropriate due to these historical 
                                                             
3 You might balk at McConwell’s referring to contingency as a cause (she discusses this at length). For 
my purposes, it is no worry whether we want to call an event’s contingency, or the processes which 
underwrite the event’s contingency, a cause. 
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processes. Evolution and these structural features themselves are, then, generative of ‘new 
forms’, we should expect a bounty of historical kinds.  
Relatedly, Bill Wimsatt emphasizes how some processes (particularly evolutionary ones) 
often generate arbitrary or accidental features which then become ‘locked in’ as essential parts 
of the system downstream. “with accumulating dependencies, seemingly arbitrary contingencies 
can become profoundly necessary, acting as generative structural elements for other 
contingencies added later” (Wimsatt 2007, 135). The conversion of contingency into necessity is 
one way in which history makes her own rules: again, harkening to Collingwood’s ‘new forms’. 
Dinosaurs happened to not be well-suited for angiosperm consumption, but the flexibility of 
angiosperms in pollination—fruit and flowers—made them ideal for fast-evolving insects. This 
contingency became locked in as the insect-angiosperm alliance, which has been stable for a 
hundred million years. Similarly, Inkpen & Turner (2012) suggest considering contingency in terms 
of a topographical landscape that evolves over time. As time passes, what is likely or unlikely to 
occur can change. Wimsatt describes a process of an at-first contingent event becoming 
increasingly necessary over time but events also might become less likely. The overall lesson is 
here that various processes are more likely to produce diversity, contingency, necessity or 
homogeneity over time. 
Kim Sterelny (2016) is interested in laws in human history. Instead of quibbling over whether 
such things exist, he asks why human history has both robust and fragile outcomes. Fragile 
outcomes are beloved by historians and story-tellers alike: if only it hadn’t rained that day, if that 
particular cavalry charge had gone differently, had I turned left rather than right, then things 
would be different—and perhaps different in unfathomable ways. However, Sterelny points to 
robust patterns and outcomes in human history. In historical science we also see both fragility 
and robustness. 
 As I’ve mentioned, one reason why we want an accurate measure of late-Cretaceous 
dinosaur diversity is to develop explanations of the K-Pg extinction. Although models of the 
asteroid impact explain the massive biodiversity plummet in the oceans (mostly through 
increased oceanic acidity), it is unclear why the same occurred on land. One hypothesis blames a 
decrease in ecological resilience among larger dinosaurs (Mitchell, Roopnarine & Anielczyk 2012). 
In particular, a decrease in the diversity of large herbivores towards the Cretaceous’ close. 
Ecological modelling suggests that large herbivores like Triceratops play important roles in 
ecosystems. Their young and eggs provide food for smaller carnivores, adults are prey for larger 
predators, and their remains and dung fertilize soil. Because they are hooked into ecosystems at 
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multiple levels, disrupting these herbivores can have disastrous consequences. On this scenario, 
towards the end of the Cretaceous, although total populations didn’t decrease, large herbivore 
biodiversity did (they became more homogenous), leaving the ecosystem dependent on the fate 
of a few species. Under these conditions—perhaps—the dinosaur’s fall was foreordained: 
critically weakened ecosystems were simply waiting for the right trigger. When exactly the fall 
would happen, or what the trigger would be, might be unknowable before the event, but the 
collapse being triggered was extremely likely.  
So, history contains both fragile—contingent—and robust events. Why? 
Sterelny’s answer is that some historical outcomes and trajectories depend “only on 
aggregate effects of interactions in populations” (532). In the scenario above, the actions or fate 
of individual Triceratops don’t make a difference: the ecosystem’s collective instability is to blame 
for the collapse. This is what underwrote the extinction’s robustness. Further, Sterelny notes that 
some systems have stabilizing mechanisms. Developmental and inheritance systems in biological 
lineages, for instance, ensure that information is carried pretty robustly across generations. In 
human systems, however, structures sometimes emerge which actively work against aggregate 
effects quashing particular individual’s contributions. Sterelny calls these ‘command structures’: 
they arise when communities shift from egalitarian modes to hierarchies with some individuals in 
charge: chiefs, generals, monarchs and bosses. 
[command structures] are a source of contingency for two reasons. They make 
population-level trajectories sensitive to the actions of the few, and they make that few 
more likely to behave in erratic, unpredictable, hair-trigger ways (534). 
Ironically, the rather robust result that human societies develop hierarchical control as 
populations increase sometimes also produces fragility: the whims of Dear Leader. 
McConwell and Sterelny’s insights can, I think, be synthesized into a story about just when 
and why history matters to knowledge. McConwell emphasizes how contingent processes can be 
generative, acting as a scaffold for new structures. Sterelny points out that the robustness or 
fragility of trajectories depends in part on the structures of those trajectories. McConwell: history 
generates a diversity of structures; Sterelny: robustness and fragility depends upon structure. 
Bringing these together generates what I’ll call peculiarity. Before introducing the account 
abstractly, let’s consider a toy case. 
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Imagine a factory which produces widgets. During production, the factory has a set of 
manipulable processes which determine the widget’s properties. For instance, we might include 
quality-control staff to ensure the widget’s homogeneity, or we might include more colours in 
the production process, leading to differently coloured widgets. This latter could be randomized, 
for instance, leading to widgets of a wide variety of colours. On leaving the factory, the widgets 
will be differently attractive to consumers depending on the widgets’ properties and their 
preferences. It may be that consumers desire reliability, at which point homogeneity-producing 
processes will be valued and reinforced. Or they may desire diversity, thus introducing more 
colours would boost sales. In this scenario we have (1) a set of processes (how the factory 
produces the widgets) which effect (2) the properties of the outputs (the colour of the widgets, 
say) which (3) make a difference to the desirability of the widgets (if customers prefer diversity, 
say), and thus the factory’s success. Under those conditions, there is a dependency between the 
processes which produce widgets and the widget’s subsequent success. This needn’t be the case: 
consumers might be indifferent to diversity and only care about reliability, at which point the 
processes producing a variety of colour make no difference to widget desirability.  
Note the possibility of feedback between the factory’s processes, the properties of the 
widgets, and public desirability. It may be that some consumers are ‘stamp-collectors’, that is, 
they value off-kilter, rare, variations in an otherwise homogenous set. If we introduce sources of 
error or otherwise variation-introducing features into the factory’s processes, this might lead to 
stamp-collectors becoming interested in widgets. This would encourage the factory’s processes 
to generate a homogenous—but not too homogenous—output. Here, a particular dynamic in 
the factory’s processes has emerged in light of the interaction between widget-properties and 
the stamp-collectors.  
This toy case can be used to illustrate the relationship between Sterelny and McConwell’s 
insights. McConwell describes how different processes are generative: a factory with some error 
in production potentially makes room for new dynamics to occur. Sterelny describes how the 
robustness or fragility of a system differs depends in part on its properties. Depending on the 
consumers, a factory with reliable widgets will have a different fate than one with less reliable 
widgets. Putting these together, we have a dependency between a set of generating and 
maintaining processes (the factory making widgets) and a system’s properties (the widget’s 
properties and their subsequent desirability). Such dependencies are the basis of peculiarity, a 
fairly ubiquitous relational property which, nonetheless, can be used to capture how history 
matters to knowledge. Here is the notion abstractly: 
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Some target is peculiar to the extent that its modal profile is sensitive to the properties of the 
processes which generate or maintain it.  
Let’s break this down. First, we have some target. I’m going to be very inclusive about what 
counts as a target: the entire Cretaceous period, the terrestrial revolution, the fate of a particular 
Triceratops…, anything we might be interested in explaining can be a target. Second, targets 
have a modal profile. To a first approximation, we might equate modal profiles with a kind of 
robustness: the likelihood of the target’s properties staying the same or changing. Likelihoods 
are conditional probabilities. Given certain conditions, changes and perturbations in background 
conditions, how likely is the target to stay the same or change? But a target’s modal profile isn’t 
simply the probability of it changing: modal profiles include the ways a target may transform 
under various conditions. There might be conditions under which the angiosperm-insect alliance 
would become less resilient (perhaps if there were a precipitous drop in insect populations…), or 
chances that its dynamics might shift (becoming more dependent upon artificial fertilization, 
say). A modal profile, then, isn’t simply robustness, but a map of the various conditions under 
which a target might change. 
As we’ve seen, Sterelny emphasizes how different structures are more-or-less robust, and are 
thus an important part of a target’s modal profile. Structures whose behaviours are aggregate 
effects tend to have robust outcomes (although may not be robust themselves: the dinosaur 
extinction may be a robust outcome even if—actually because—dinosaur ecosystems were not 
themselves resilient). Other structures increase contingency, such as some hierarchical control 
structures. But to generalize from Sterelny, function can affect modal profile as well. The modal 
profile of Pachycephalosaurus depends in part on the function of their thickened skulls. If the 
function is mate-mate competition, or if it is display, the subsequent evolutionary profiles are 
different. For instance, if the former holds, the direction of evolution depends on other males, 
whereas if the latter holds, it depends on female mating preference. By ‘modal profile’, then, I 
mean the kinds of changes and transformations (and the accompanying likelihoods) a system 
may undergo given the system’s properties and relevant background. 
Third, targets arise from, and are maintained by, processes. As with targets, we should be 
open-minded about what will count as a process. The splitting of Gondwana was a process which 
potentially led to the emergence of the insect-angiosperm alliance (and the undermining of 
dinosaur dominance); but Gondwana’s unity prior to the terrestrial revolution was a process 
which maintained the Dinosaur-gymnosperm alliance of the Jurassic and early Cretaceous. When 
peculiarity holds, the target’s modal profile is sensitive to some features of these processes. 
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What kinds of features? One way of capturing the relevant features is to ask whether the process 
is diversity-boosting or dampening. In our factory, we might change the properties of the widgets, 
or the consumer’s preferences regarding the widgets, either way these change the likelihood of 
the target changing or remaining the same over time. So, a process is diversity-boosting when, 
versus some competitors, it is more likely to generate a diverse set of outcomes. Because they 
encourage population isolation and environmental variability, dispersed continents are more 
diversity-boosting than a megacontinent. Often, extremely stable systems are such in virtue of 
dampening diversity. A too-diversity-boosting developmental system (one with a high mutation 
rate for instance) is unlikely to generate a viable organism. So by dampening diversity, stability is 
achieved. Diversity-dampening or boosting aren’t the only features of processes which might 
matter, but they’re prominent in the cases we’re considering.  
Peculiarity does not turn on the robustness or fragility of the target, but on the extent to 
which the target’s modal features are due to structures which are themselves the outcomes of 
generating or maintaining processes (if you want, they are second-order fragile, even if they are 
first-order robust). Returning to our factory, diverse or homogenous widgets might be produced, 
but that does not make these peculiar. One which aims for a heterogenous (or homogenous) 
product—if it succeeds—might produce peculiarity if that is desired or disliked by consumers in a 
fashion which makes a difference to whether the factory continues producing widgets of that 
type or not. Peculiarity requires that the generating or maintaining process’ features are 
responsible for the modal profile of the target. That is, it captures a sensitivity between, on the 
one hand, a generating or maintaining process and, on the other hand, the modal profile of the 
target. If I change the properties of the process (making it more diversity-boosting, say) does this 
change the target’s modal properties? If so, then the target is peculiar regarding that process. 
The extent of peculiarity depends upon how much the modal profile of the target changes given 
that counterfactual. 
Peculiarity is sensitive to description; how something is peculiar depends in part on our focus. 
If all dinosaurs share the same developmental systems, then in part the surprising 
Pachycephalosaur ontogeny is maintained by diversity-dampening inheritance processes which 
ensure continuity across dinosaurs. Qua dinosaurs, the distinctive ontogenetic patterns they 
exhibit could be due to processes occurring after dinosaurs diverged from crocodilians. In light of 
this sensitivity, it might make more sense to ask whether a target is peculiar in relation to some 
set of processes than to ask whether a target is peculiar per se. Presumably for almost every 
target there will be some process they are relevantly sensitive to, but still some modal profiles 
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exhibit less constraint from those processes than others and, as I’ll argue, it is for those more 
constrained, more sensitive targets that history matters. 
Let’s consider the peculiarity of dinosaur morphological development under the assumption 
that Horner and company’s hypothesis, that they exhibit wide variation across ontogeny, is true. 
First, living relatives can help determine to what extent this feature of their development 
depended on past processes. Birds and crocodiles exhibit variation over their lifetimes, 
crocodilians especially often adopting different behaviours and ecological roles as they age, but 
we see nothing like the morphological variation expressed in Triceratops or Pachycephalosaurus. 
No anatomist worth their crust would mistake a baby croc for a new kind of croc. This suggests 
dinosaur development is due to changes occurring post their divergence from birds and 
crocodiles, for if it weren’t, then we’d expect patterns of development to be stable, conserved, 
across these taxa. A non-generative, non-contingent process wouldn’t produce diversity. Does 
the modal profile of dinosaur ontogeny depend upon structures which are the product of those 
processes? Yes: the developmental systems underwriting the radical ontogenetic diversity of 
dinosaurs is bequeathed in large part from their evolutionary history. Dinosaur ontogeny, then, is 
peculiar: it is well-captured by diachronic kinding. 
Recall the aim of this part: to make some headway on the nature of history. We started with 
Collingwood’s intriguing suggestion that history generates new forms. I then suggested that we 
can understand these new forms in terms of diachronic kinds: categories where membership 
turns on having a particular history. Peculiarity, I think, leads to diachronic kinds. Peculiarity is an 
inherently historical notion, because it involves earlier processes providing the conditions which 
give rise to later states of affairs. But it doesn’t capture just any temporally-extended process: it 
is restricted to those targets who have developed, or emerged due to, particular dependencies 
with generating or maintaining processes. Such processes often provide a basis for 
Collingwood’s ‘new forms’. The angiosperm-insect alliance which dominated the Cenozoic has 
been highly stable. And it is plausibly highly peculiar, if indeed it depended upon the continental 
break-up and on the emergence of the highly diverse, plastic developmental systems of 
angiosperms. Peculiarity, then, is not merely temporal, but could reasonably be called historical.  
Merely being past is not enough to be historical, and I suggest that peculiarity (or relative 
peculiarity) can tell the difference. I suspect peculiarity is a near-ubiquitous feature of our world: 
look hard enough at anything and you’ll find some peculiarity. History’s reach is long and the 
popularity of diachronic kinds is a testament to it. To what extent peculiarity occurs is an open 
empirical question. However, my argument doesn’t quite turn on peculiarity’s commonality, I’m 
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making a conceptual claim: history matters under conditions of peculiarity. As some targets are 
more peculiar than others—their modal profiles more dependent on particular processes—we 
should expect these highly peculiar targets to, as it were, be more demanding of an historical 
treatment (we’ll get to those historical treatments in the next section). 
Accounts of historical or evolutionary contingency often focus on historical outcomes’ 
sensitivity to initial conditions and path-dependence (Beatty 2006, Desjardins 2011). On such 
views the fragility and specificity of history’s path are emphasized. I think these are inadequate 
for understanding how history matters for two reasons. First, they have difficulty capturing the 
remarkable stability of many of history’s players. The dinosaurs dominated Earth’s ecosystems 
for over a hundred-million years—they were very robust—but this doesn’t make them any less 
historical. Second, by focusing on outcomes they de-emphasize the importance of the processes 
which enable and shape history and their capacity to generate new kinds and dynamics 
(McConwell & Currie 2017). Peculiarity is richer than these accounts and, as we’ll see below, is 
better placed for understanding how history matters for knowledge. 
History’s peculiarity goes some way, I think, to explaining a major theme of Part 1: the 
localness of justification and knowledge in historical science. I argued that abstract, coarse-
grained ways of thinking about evidence don’t gain purchase because the licence of historical 
inferences typically depend on particular and idiosyncratic factors. And this is just what we 
should expect from peculiarity. As peculiarity sometimes involves new forms, new dynamics and 
new diachronic kinds arising, so also will knowledge of such systems be increasingly restricted to 
those local conditions. The idiosyncratic, opportunistic methodology of historical scientists (and, I 
imagine, many scientists overall) is an adaptation to the peculiarity of their subject matter. 
Why does peculiarity matter for questions relating to history and knowledge? I’m going to 
argue that history matters for knowledge when history is peculiar. To demonstrate this, I’ll turn 
to historical explanation. 
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Part 3: Historical Explanation 
History raises bountiful whats and whens: the mid-Cretaceous terrestrial revolution saw 
increased biodiversity in many land-based lineages; it occurred roughly 125 million years ago. But 
history also provides hows and whys: the emergence of flowering plants opened new niches for 
insects to occupy, thus perhaps partly driving rapid diversification. Philosophers have long 
worried about the relationship between descriptions—whats and whens—and explanations—
hows and whys. What’s the difference between describing and explaining? In virtue of what does 
explanation bring more to the table than mere description? In this part, I’m interested in whether 
history makes a difference to explanation. I think it does: specifically, history’s peculiarity makes a 
difference to the appropriateness of various explanatory forms.  
 I’ll start by discussing narrative explanation In 3.1. In 3.2 I’ll provide a thin, ecumenical 
account of the difference between descriptions and explanations: I’ll argue that explanations are 
descriptions which are situated in a way that generates understanding (or other explanatory 
goods). In 3.3, I’ll argue that peculiarity is well suited to particular kinds of situating: narrative 
ones. As such, we can see why narrative forms of explanation are so suitable to history—because 
they capture peculiarity. 
How general is my account? I’d love for it to turn out that I’ve captured every instance where 
history matters for knowledge.  However, my discussion is no doubt driven by the examples 
we’ve been considering: macroevolutionary change and paleobiological studies of ontogeny. It 
may be that other contexts exhibit different kinds of historicity, but this would need to be 
shown. So, I’m officially agnostic about my view’s scope: perhaps take it to be a speculative 
hypothesis aimed at opening discussion. I’m perfectly happy if my view ends up being an 
important part—if not the whole story—of the relationship between history and explanation. 
3.1 Narrative Explanation 
Historical explanations seem to take a narrative form. Consider: 
The modern world was formed in the mid-Cretaceous. Crucial aspects of modern biota 
emerged then, as did familiar geography. The mid-Cretaceous terrestrial revolution occurred 
during the super-continent Gondwana’s final break-up, and these are plausibly linked. 
Supercontinents are diversity-dampening. A large single landmass leads to comparatively 
homogenous environments, and isolated populations are rare. The emergence of modern 
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continents encouraged heterogeneous biomes, founder populations, and so forth. Another of 
the revolution’s important ingredients was the radiation of angiosperms. This led to a whole new 
host of mutualistic alliances between flowering plants and their pollinators, which in turn 
scaffolded new niches: consuming angiosperms or predating on their pollinators.  
The success of angiosperms—their multiple radiations, their very high biodiversity (a quarter 
of a million species!), and so forth—has received multiple explanations. As Benton (2010) puts it, 
their success was in part due to key innovations coupled with high morphological plasticity. 
Angiosperms developed edible fruit, rapid growth, and efficient hydraulic systems. Benton 
argues angiosperms drove insect diversification, not vice-versa. 
Studies so far suggest that the correlates of angiosperm diversification  are  manifold,  
and  that  insect  pollination,  for  example,  is  not  an  adequate  driver  on  its own.  
Combined fossil and molecular phylogenetic data show repeated bursts of diversification, 
associated with the evolutionary introduction   of   novel   functional   traits   throughout   
the history of the flowering plants. (Benton 2010, 3672, references removed), 
It has been suggested that dinosaurs benefitted only minimally from these new angiosperm 
niches: evidence that they ate angiosperms is equivocal (Ghosh et al 2003). As the team who 
introduced the notion of the mid-Cretaceous terrestrial revolution put it: 
Plant-eating insects and mammals very likely benefited more from the new sources of 
plant food. Detailed studies of dinosaurian herbivory and plant evolution has already 
suggested there was limited evidence that angiosperm diversification drove the 
Cretaceous diversification of dinosaurs. Our new evidence confirms that the [mid-
Cretaceous terrestrial revolution] was key in the origination of modern continental 
ecosystems, but that the dinosaurs were not a part of it. Hadrosaurs and ceratopsians 
showed late diversifications, but not enough to save the dinosaur dynasty from its fate. 
(Paleobiology research group, accessed 23/11/2018, references removed). 
A picture emerges: the break-up of Gondwana and the evolution of angiosperms created a 
wide array of new niches which drove diversification in a range of terrestrial vertebrates. 
Dinosaurs, perhaps due to over-specialization on gymnosperms and ferns, were slow or limited in 
their ability to capitalize on these new niches. This shifted the ‘world order’ which had held from 
the late Triassic to the early Cretaceous: an alliance between gymnosperms and dinosaurs on 
relatively homogenous super-continents; thus fatally undermining the basis of dinosaur 
dominance.  
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I’m here less interested in the evidential support this explanation may or may not have than I 
am interested in the explanation’s form: what we have here looks like a narrative. In this 
narrative, we come to understand the emergence of the modern world by telling a story about 
how those features emerged. At base, a narrative explains some outcome by identifying a 
sequence of events—a trajectory—involving that outcome, often culminating in the explanatory 
target (Currie 2014, Currie & Sterelny 2017). The mid-Cretaceous Terrestrial Revolution occurred 
because splitting continents led to increasingly patchy, heterogeneous environments and 
isolated populations, both of which increase diversity over evolutionary time, while roughly 
simultaneously the radiation of angiosperms opened up new niche spaces for diverse lineages to 
occupy.  
My aim in this section is to examine philosophical accounts of narrative. Along the way, I’ll 
focus on three questions. First, are narratives distinct from other kinds of explanation? Second, 
what are narratives for? That is, what kind of epistemic value does a narrative bring with it? Third, 
questions of realism: to what extent do historians discover narratives, and to what extent do 
they construct them? Realism in this context is understood in a particular way. Both realists and 
anti-realists agree on the past existing and on our having knowledge of it. They come apart on 
the nature of narrative events, that is, the aspects of the past that are highlighted as being 
significant in an historical narrative. For anti-realists, attributions of significance are the 
projections of historians, while for realists there is a mind-independent fact of the matter about 
historical significance; anti-realists think narrative structure is imposed on the world to make 
sense of it for us, realists think narrative structure in part reflects how the world is. 
Much discussion of narrative is rooted in Carl Hempel’s account of scientific explanation, 
which emphasized the roles of laws: a scientific explanation cites some initial conditions, as well 
as some necessary laws, then shows how the thing-to-be-explained follows deductively from 
these (Hempel 1942). Historians rarely cite anything approaching a necessary law, and their 
explanations don’t appear to be deductive. Hempel’s response was to consider narrative 
explanations explanation sketches: proto-explanations. Others objected, arguing that history has 
a distinct mode of explanation, with a different logic and structure. There were differing views 
regarding how the logic differed. William Dray, for instance, argued that the split between 
historical and scientific explanation lies in the modal character of the information communicated 
(1957). Scientific explanations deductively infer how the event actually occurred; historical 
explanations demonstrate how the event could possibly have occurred (see also Gallie 1964). The 
disagreement between Dray and Hempel, in my view, founders due to reliance on the contrast 
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between how-actually explanations, which rely on necessary laws to tell us what in fact 
happened, and how-possibly explanations which simply provide sufficient but unnecessary 
conditions. As we saw in the discussions of laws, above, historical processes generate a wide 
variety of regularities: ‘necessity’ and ‘possibility’ are far too coarse to accommodate the various 
modal scopes involved in historical explanation; we’ll need a richer conceptual toolkit. 
Some have understood narrative explanation by equating it with intentional explanation, 
what Elizabeth Anscombe called ‘reason-giving’ explanations (Anscombe 1963). Anscombe 
contrasted reason-giving with causal explanations, the difference being that one cites mere 
causes while the other cites the means-ends reasoning of an agent. This thought, I suspect, 
underwrites the (to me, baffling) assertion that narrative explanations are not causal. I doubt the 
value of equating narratives with intentional explanation. For one thing, there are plenty of 
explanations which have narrative features—even within history—that are not ‘reason-giving’ in 
Anscombe’s sense. My discussion of the mid-Cretaceous Terrestrial Revolution is one. For 
another thing, given the diversity of causal explanations (see next section), it is far from clear to 
me why the category of intentional explanation ought to be granted special, non-causal, status.  
Arthur Danto argues that narrative explanations capture a particular kind of historical 
knowledge (Danto 1964, 1985). The historical version of whats and whens are ‘chronologies’: 
ordered lists of events. The historian’s job is to weave chronologies into narratives. What is so 
special about that? For Danto, past events gain significance in virtue of their relationship with 
future events. The evolution of flowering plants in the Cretaceous had momentous 
consequences. It shaped many aspects of the modern world, particularly enabling the wide 
variety of pollinating insects whose mutualisms with angiosperms are such a distinctive part of 
global biota today. Only in retrospect, in recognising that how things are now was in part due to 
how things were then, can this significance be recognised. The historian takes a chronology and, 
using a ‘narrative structure’ which highlights points in the chronology and links them together, 
shows how past events gave rise to later ones. Telling a ‘history of angiosperms’, for instance, 
involves highlighting the mid-Cretaceous terrestrial revolution, while de-emphasizing other 
events. Further, Danto argues that for such events to count as events in the first place, the 
historian’s hand is necessary. Chronologies do not properly-speaking have events in the mind-
independent sense. This is a form of anti-realism: events are not ‘in the world’ independently of 
historians (see also Roth 2017). 
Another anti-realist is Louis Mink, who emphasizes the relationship between literary fiction 
and historical narratives: both use narrative structure as a ‘cognitive device’ (see also Ricoeur 
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2010). Narratives make sense of historical episodes, thus generating human understanding. For 
Mink these narrative structures are not, as it were, in the world waiting to be discovered. Rather, 
we project them: the past is carved up into events according to the narrative structure we are 
using. One of his reasons for thinking this is that narratives do not aggregate. If there is a single 
narrative structure in the past then we should expect different narratives to be easily 
combinable. Yet they are not: 
A narrative must have a unity of its own; this is what is acknowledged in saying that it 
must have a beginning, middle, and an end. And the reason why two narratives cannot be 
merely additively combined… is that [we need] a new unity, which replaces the 
independent coherence of each of its parts rather than uniting them (197). 
I find Mink’s argument unconvincing. Explanations don’t simply foreground and background, 
they also often distort and idealize: some features can be presented in exaggerated or simplified 
ways in order to aid in understanding, or emphasize their importance, or to demonstrate the 
affinities of that event with salient others. Because of these perfectly legitimate explanatory 
practices, mutually compatible explanations of the same event will not necessarily aggregate. 
But this doesn’t lead to anti-realism about historical events, as the distortions are a feature of 
how the events are fitted into explanations, not of the events themselves.  
David Hull is a realist.  For him, where Hempel-style scientific explanations gain their unity 
from the laws appealed to, a narrative explanation is unified, is a coherent whole, because it is 
about a particular kind of thing, a ‘central subject’ (Hull 1975, Currie & Walsh forthcoming). We 
might equate central subjects with token-historical-kinds. The history of a lineage, the evolution 
of Triceratops, say, is not coherent in virtue of there being some general law governing how they 
evolve. Instead there is an individual—a single topic—that the explanation tracks across time. 
And it is that single topic which grants the explanation coherency, and its narrative form. Hull is a 
realist because there is some object in the world that grounds narrative: we don’t project the 
narrative onto the central subject, rather our narrative reflects features the central subject has. 
John Beatty connects narrative explanation with contingency (Beatty 2016, 2017). On Beatty’s 
account, a narrative contrasts a particular sequence with close-by ‘narratively possible’ could-
have-beens. Perhaps the angiosperm radiation was dependent upon the breakup of Gondwana 
(let’s say the continental spread was required to weaken the dinosaur-gymnosperm regime, 
which gave angiosperms their evolutionary opportunity). Under this scenario, the narrative 
highlights the contingency of the end-Cretaceous revolution on geographical changes. By tracing 
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the branching moment (in this case, the continental break-up) we contrast how things actually 
went with how things could have gone in relevantly different circumstances. 
[Narratives] relate what happened, one event at a time. All narratives do that. But 
some… do more; they relate what happened, one event at a time, while indicating that 
some of those events might not have happened, but did. And they also indicate that what 
did happen, vs. what might have, was consequential. (2016, 34) 
Beatty adopts a loose, inclusive notion of ‘narrative’ and highlights particular narrative types 
as being particularly interesting. This is promising, and it is a strategy I’ll follow below: instead of 
wrangling about just what a narrative is, we can ask what a narrative is good for. As I’ll expand on 
in 3.3, Beatty’s answer is that narratives are particularly good for explaining change via contrast 
with other possibilities: “tracing one path through a maze of alternative possibilities, and alluding 
to those possibilities along the way, is what narrative does particularly well” (2017, 34). 
There are stronger and weaker ways of characterizing questions about narrative distinctness. 
Paul Roth puts things in a particularly strong way: 
[the distinctiveness of narratives turns on] whether or not an explanation in this form can 
also be non-narratively structured. That is, does it allow for paraphrase into some other, 
non-narrative explanatory form? For if so, then whatever explanatory import such a 
narrative seemingly possesses revealing how things at the beginning of a time series 
came to be what they later were turns out to be inessential for purposes of explanation. 
(2017, 43) 
  
The thought goes: I can capture scientific explanations using logical form (the scientist cites 
some initial conditions, cites some law-like regularities, and then derives the thing-to-be-
explained from that), and this logical form explains something about why the explanation is an 
explanation (that is, it goes beyond mere description) because (1) it shows how the thing-to-be-
explained had, or at least was likely, to happen given those initial conditions; (2) it unifies the 
thing-to-be-explained as an instance of a type of event. To defend narrative explanation, you 
must first show that I cannot translate narratives into scientific explanations. For if I can, then 
there is nothing distinctive of them. Then, to show that narratives in fact explain, you should 
convince me of their explanatory powers. 
Building on Danto, Roth takes the answer to lie in ‘narrative sentences’. In a narrative 
sentence, the thing-to-be-explained, and the things-doing-the-explaining are not independent in a 
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way which allows explanation to take the form of a valid logical argument. In his words, they are 
‘indetachable’. Consider the term ‘mid-Cretaceous Terrestrial Revolution’. This points to a stage 
in history (a point, or series of points, in a chronology) and (1) identifies it as being the middle 
stage of something (the Cretaceous), (2) implies some significance for it in light of future events. 
Consider this sentence: 
 The mid-Cretaceous Terrestrial Revolution set the stage for the modern world. 
This is what Danto calls a ‘narrative sentence’. It is about some earlier time (the revolution) 
but is defined in light of its significance at later times. These “refer to at least two time-separated 
events though they only describe and are only about the earliest event to which they refer” 
(Danto 1964, 147, italics in original). So although the sentence is about events, say, 100 million 
years ago, its truth depends on events occurring much later. Roth argues that the links between 
the earlier and later states in a narrative explanation cannot be captured in a Hempel-style 
explanation because the thing-which-is-explained and the thing-which-does-the-explaining are 
inseparable. Because of this inseparability, any argument with one as the conclusion and the 
other as a premise would be circular. Importantly for Roth, this feature of narrative sentences is 
necessarily retrospective: it is only in light of taking an historical perspective, looking back, that 
the significance of past events can be identified. Roth takes this to mean that historical events 
are constructions—this is another route to antirealism about historical events. 
Roth and Danto, then, adopt a kind of philosophical challenge for the legitimacy of narratives: 
identify some feature in virtue of which narratives are logically different from—that is, not 
intertranslatable with—other forms of explanation, particularly Hempel-style explanations. In 
section 1.1, I worried about these kinds of philosophical challenges: they often leave accounts 
beholden to fundamental philosophical analysis and they can be dangerously detached from the 
phenomenon we’re interested in explaining. There are two further reasons to reject Roth and 
Danto’s approach. One has to do with the diversity of accounts of explanation on the market: 
philosophers of science increasingly recognise a plurality of explanatory-types, and in light of this, 
demanding that each type be logically different to each other (particularly Hempel’s account), is 
insufficiently sensitive to the more pragmatic, pluralistic turn the philosophy of explanation has 
taken. As I’ll expand on this argument in the next subsection, I’ll spend more time here on the 
another reason: the connection to anti-realism. 
Because Roth and Danto’s challenge links narrative to linguistic constructions it is closely 
aligned to anti-realism. As we’ve seen, anti-realism is at base the idea that narratives (or events in 
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a narrative) are ‘projected onto’ the world: narrative structure is not part of nature. A realist 
about narrative will argue that at least some aspects of the world’s structure are captured by 
narratives. To be clear: both realists and anti-realists agree that narratives are legitimate and 
important knowledge-generating tools. The question turns on whether these tools are, as it 
were, purely cognitive; only working to make sense of an otherwise senseless world, or whether 
they additionally track real features that the world has. 
Anti-realism cannot do justice to a class of substantive debates common in historical science. 
Roth has argued that although narratives are underdetermined by evidence, we can judge 
between narratives in terms of “their fruitfulness in guiding research and their resources for 
solving problems” (Roth 1988, 12). For anti-realists, then, debates about history should turn on 
either (1) whether or not such-and-such events occurred when they did (that is, disagreements 
about chronologies) or (2) whether or not such-and-such events are significant (disagreements 
about narrative structure). This latter kind of debate turns on facts about us as knowers 
(problem-solving or fruitfulness, say) not on the state of the world. However, historical scientists 
commonly debate the significance of historical events in empirical terms. Consider models of 
dinosaur extinction. One hypothesis claims the impact event knocked out a thriving biota, and so 
was highly significant, while other hypotheses highlight previous events (the mid-Cretaceous 
revolution, for instance) which critically weakened the biota, thus lessening the impact’s 
significance. Such debates are neither simply about what events occurred in what order, nor 
about which way of framing the events is the most psychologically satisfying or fruitful. They are 
about whether some narrative or the other is true (or, if you want, truer). Scientists engaged in 
these debates, as we’ve seen, marshal empirical information in determining significance: whether 
the events of the mid-Cretaceous could have weakened dinosaur ecosystems as suggested, 
whether the patterns of disappearances from the fossil record match the hypotheses, and so on. 
No doubt historical disputes are subtle matters (Currie & Walsh forthcoming), but they are 
substantive, empirical and, unless anti-realists can show how to satisfactorily accommodate 
them, this motivates realism about historical events. There is often a fact of the matter about 
whether an event is significant. 
If we are to reject the need for the philosophical bar Roth has set, how should we approach 
narratives in science instead? Recall John Beatty’s earlier suggestion (2016) that instead of asking 
what narrative are, we ask what they are good for. I take this to be in line with the practice-based 
approach we have followed. A practice-based approach to narrative, I take it, involves (1) 
examining narratives as they appear in science, and (2) consider why narratives might be useful 
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for scientists’ purposes. This doesn’t require showing that narratives differ logically from other 
kinds of explanations, but rather requires identifying features of narratives that make them 
suitable for various kinds of task. To do this, I want to first say something general about 
explanation, and use this to bring out the relevant narrative features. 
3.2 Explaining as situating 
Philosophers increasingly recognise a variety of explanatory forms. A common theme of the 
last thirty years has been ecumenism: the idea that there are different kinds of legitimate 
explanations (more controversial) and that, for any one phenomenon, there are at least two 
legitimate explanations applicable (less controversial) (Jackson & Pettit 1992, Sterelny 1996). 
We’ve seen that discussion of narrative often leans on an explicit comparison with Hempel-style, 
covering-law explanations. It is taken that explicating something in-principally different from law-
based explanation is required to legitimize narrative explanation. But philosophers of science 
have described a plethora of ways of shifting from what and whens to whys and hows. And this 
undermines both demanding there be a logical distinction between explanations and the 
contrast with covering-law explanations in particular. As I’ll explain, I think of these different 
explanatory forms as different ways of ‘situating’ a target. Let’s consider a few examples, before 
thinking about narratives more carefully. My discussion of non-narrative explanation will be 
purposefully sketchy, as my purpose is simply to give a flavour of some options. 
As we’ve seen, ‘deductive nomological’ or ‘covering-law’ explanations situate a target in 
terms of a necessary law and a set of initial conditions: they show how, given a set of dynamics 
and an initial condition, the outcome simply had to happen. The target is situated in an argument 
with a deductive structure. This often leads to its being considered in abstract ways. This 
abstraction often makes covering-law explanations useful for considering the target as a token of 
a type.  
 Alternatively, we might situate a phenomenon mechanistically (Craver 2007, Machamer, 
Darden & Craver 2000). A mechanistic explanation accounts for some phenomenon by 
identifying the entity that produces it. The entity is decomposed to its constituent parts, and the 
entity’s capacities are explained by considering the causal powers of those parts and their 
relations. Investigation of the function of the thickened skulls of Pachycephalosaurus look 
mechanistic in this way. The skull is considered in terms of how tightly packed and dense the 
materials making it up are, and these are used to try to understand how much stress it could 
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undergo. The causal power of the skull—its resilience—is understood in terms of its constituents 
and their activities. 
Another way of situating a phenomenon is via minimal modelling (Weisberg 2007). A minimal 
model is an attempt to isolate the ‘essential dynamics’ of some system and use these dynamics to 
explain the system’s behaviour. As Michael Weisberg has put it, “the key to explanation is a 
special set of explanatorily privileged causal factors. Minimalist idealization is what isolates these 
causes and thus plays a crucial role for explanation” (2007, 103). The earlier appeal to weakened 
terrestrial dinosaur ecosystems in explaining their extinction looks like this. The ecology is 
represented using a simplified model, which is taken to capture what matters concerning the 
resilience of that kind of ecosystem. Minimal modelling involves, then, focusing on a few features 
of the target and considering their similarities to an idealized version of those features. 
Explanations, on the pluralist view I’m pushing, take non-explanatory information 
(descriptions) and situates them in a way which makes sense to us, which has some explanatory 
pay-off. The difference between what and why is that whys require situating the what in a way 
that generates understanding. The wide variety of explanatory strategies reflect the wide variety 
of ways in which we might situate our target, and the variety of explanatory payoffs (kinds of 
understanding) we might desire concerning out target. My argument for history mattering for 
knowledge is based on the thought that some targets—peculiar ones—demand narrative 
explanation. Before getting to that argument, we should return to narratives: how do they 
situate? 
As we’ve seen, Danto thinks about narrative in terms of ‘temporal structures’. Temporal 
structures highlight some aspects and background other aspects of a chronology, linking them 
together and creating a narrative. Similarly, Hull highlights the central subjects around which the 
coherency of the narrative is woven. Narratives are token, multi-step trajectories. The target is 
temporally situated, taken as a step along a particular process, or the culmination of that 
process. But, following Beatty, narratives do not simply situate temporally (‘relating what 
happened one event at a time’) but also modally. In foregrounding particular events and 
processes as being significant, their causal powers—how they shape the trajectory—are 
emphasized. Including the rise of angiosperms in our narrative of dinosaur extinction links these 
two: the occurrence or otherwise of the radiation made an important difference to the dinosaur 
extinction. Narratives situate a temporal trajectory within a possibility space. 
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Because narratives take the form of a trajectory linked together through varying degrees of 
significance, they can accommodate a lot of complexity. And not simply complexity in the sense 
of there being many interacting parts: historical explanations often demand different 
components operating at different scales. The mid-Cretaceous Revolution is like this: explaining it 
requires reference to geographical changes, the relationship between geography and 
biodiversity, specific information about the developmental plasticity of angiosperms, why 
dinosaurs were less able to adapt to the new environments, and so forth. Narratives have an 
expansiveness and the capacity to accommodate a variety of features that makes them well-
suited to these kinds of complexity. 
Another feature narratives are adept at capturing is disunity or uniqueness. There’s reason to 
believe dinosaurs have distinctively plastic morphological development, and this might explain 
their apparently inflated biodiversity in the late Cretaceous. In understanding this development, 
we typically want to know what makes dinosaurs different from, say, crocodilians or birds (or 
even mammals). Because narratives focus on token trajectories, they are well placed to capture 
disunity. Finally—and perhaps most obviously—narratives capture temporality. The mid-
Cretaceous Revolution wasn’t simply a period of change or disruption, it involved a shift from one 
business-as-usual to a new business-as-usual. Often such shifts are path-dependent, their 
occurrence turns on the ordering of events, and such shifts can involve changes in dynamics, 
illustrated by the decrease in the resilience of dinosaur communities in the late-Cretaceous. That 
narratives represent by picking out events from within a chronology makes them well-suited for 
capturing this temporality. 
Narratives, then, are good for situating explanatory targets which are complex, disunified 
and temporal. It doesn’t follow that other explanatory forms cannot also manage to 
accommodate these features: I’ve argued that we shouldn’t accept Danto and Roth’s challenge, 
instead considering explanatory forms in terms of what they are good for. Along these lines, I 
also don’t think that narratives capture complexity, disunity and temporality by definition (I’ve 
argued elsewhere that narratives are sometimes simple, Currie 2014, and Glennan 2010 has 
argued that mechanistic explanation can also accommodate some of these features), rather, 
these are properties well-suited to a narrative treatment. So, rather than seeing the variety of 
explanatory forms as being in competition, we can view them as complementary: they are 
different explanatory strategies; they are different ‘ways of situating’. This stance is easily 
adopted if we refuse to provide logical, absolute and fundamental grounds for separating 
explanatory forms. Whether or not ultimately I could translate a mechanistic explanation into a 
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narrative or minimal model explanation (or vice-versa), if we think of them as explanatory 
approaches or strategies, they are nonetheless different ways of explaining in practice. Note also 
there is no tension between me characterizing narratives as I have while refusing to provide a 
strict, logical definition of them: my characterization serves to pick out a set of explanatory 
forms, without asking whether they are translatable into others. 
I do think there is a way of unifying these disparate accounts, however. They are all ways of 
shifting from descriptions to explanations via situating. A mechanistic explanation situates the 
target in terms of the activities and causal relations between component parts; a minimal model 
explanation situates a target as imperfectly instantiating a set of causal dynamics; a covering-law 
explanation situates a target as being the necessary outcome of a set of initial conditions; a 
narrative explanation situates a target as being part of, or the culmination of, a causal trajectory 
over time. 
Although it is pretty shallow, this ‘situating’ account of explanation does important work for 
me here: it allows us to re-tool Roth and Danto’s challenge for narrative explanation in weaker, 
more pragmatic terms. Specifically, are there targets which, as it were, demand that they be 
situated in narratives, those which are particularly well-suited to narrative treatments? I think 
there are: targets exhibiting peculiarity. 
3.3 Peculiar explanations 
I’ve introduced the notion of narrative explanations, explanations which account for 
particular events, processes or entities by situating them within a multiple-part trajectory and 
contrasting them with other possibilities. In section 2.3 I argued that distinctively historical 
processes lead to peculiarity: often generating their own dynamics, or kinds, via path-dependent, 
transformative sequences. Here, I want to bring these aspects—narrative explanation and 
peculiarity—together, and argue that narrative explanations are particularly well-suited to, 
perhaps even necessitated by, historical peculiarity. Narratives are good at accommodating—
situating—peculiarity. And it is the historian’s interest in, and concern for, the peculiar which 
explains their penchant for narrative. 
This view has most in common with that of John Beatty. Recently, Beatty has provided an 
account of narrative-worthiness (what narratives are good for) in terms of their capturing 
‘narratively open’ possibilities (2017) and, so far as I can tell, what I have to say here coheres with 
his account. But he has also provided (2016) an argument rooted in the notion of ‘choice-points’ 
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or ‘eventful-events’, and where his and my accounts come apart in this regard is instructive. 
Beatty emphasizes how narratives highlight moments where some trajectory could have gone 
differently, and from this argues that narratives are worth telling when they capture ‘branching 
events’, moments in an actual history where things could have gone one way but instead went 
another. If the dinosaur extinction was indeed caused by a big rock hitting the Earth, then that 
impact event was a choice-point: history’s path switched from one trajectory and careened into 
another. 
While both Beatty and I emphasize the modal character of narratives, he conceives of this 
modal character in terms of a tree with distinct branching moments. A moment in a narrative is a 
choice-point depending on “whether it leaves open or forecloses the possibility of reaching that 
goal” (36): choice-points are when the contingent becomes locked in, or (perhaps, Beatty isn’t 
explicit about this), possibilities are opened up. If, say, the asteroid impact 65.5 million years ago 
was necessary for the dinosaur extinction, then it is a choice-point: if the rock hadn’t hit, then the 
dinosaurs wouldn’t have gone extinct. Choice-points are a kind of possibility bottleneck. I’m 
going to sketch three arguments against the idea that capturing choice-points is what narratives 
are good for, which will set us up for my positive account. In fairness, Beatty might be making a 
claim about sufficiency rather than necessity: choice-points might simply be one of many things 
narratives are good for. And indeed, my account doesn’t exclude choice-points: choice-points are 
one common feature of peculiar histories, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient for them. 
First, Beatty (like myself) is plausibly read as a realist: narrative events are not things we 
project onto the past, but things we discover in the process of investigating it. I worry that 
Beatty’s account is in danger of conflating real stories with good stories. No doubt good stories 
emphasize change and contingency: a story where nothing changes, or very little is at stake in 
the changes that do happen, is a boring story. But there is nothing to guarantee the world 
follows the dictates of good storytelling. Real stories might often be boring. If narratives are the 
modus operandi of historical science, and narratives are only worth telling when things are 
‘interesting’ (that is, when there are ‘choice-points’) then either large amounts of history will go 
unexamined or we might begin over-projecting contingency onto the world. This challenges 
realism by introducing systematic bias into historical explanation. 
Second, and again assuming that narratives are supposed to be a privileged mode of 
explanation in history, Beatty’s view prioritizes explanations of change over stability. The world is 
often a chaotic, complex place: we might think that what is remarkable is not that things change, 
but that sometimes they don’t. Consider punctuated equilibrium models of speciation. As we saw 
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in part 1, these are contrasted with gradual phyletic speciation. According to punctuated 
equilibria, a species’ life is marked by stability which then collapses (Turner forthcoming). Derek 
Turner (2018) has argued that one of the central reasons for paleontology’s uneasy relationship 
with more traditional Darwinian approaches to biology is (in essence) the former’s focus on 
explaining change rather than stasis. For the biologist focused on explaining change, stasis in the 
fossil record is mostly ignored, but for paleobiologists (particularly those interested in 
punctuated models of speciation) stasis is a phenomenon: it is something to be explained, and, I 
think, explained in a narrative way. John Dupre and Dan Nicholson make this point much more 
generally: 
In any scientific enquiry it is necessary to distinguish what requires explanation from what 
is background, taken for granted. The orthodox substantialist position of modern science 
typically takes this background to involve stability: if nothing changes, then nothing 
requires explanation… For a process, however, change is the norm, and it is relative 
stability that takes priority in the explanatory order. (Dupre & Nicholson 2018, 14). 
This leaves open discussions about when stasis deserves explanation and whether Beatty’s 
appeal to ‘eventful events’ could be adapted to stasis. I’m not sure: we’re sometimes interested 
in stability in terms of its origins—in virtue of what did the angiosperm-insect alliance arise and 
what explains its subsequent stasis? The earlier conjunct plausibly involves an eventful-event, but 
the later does not. We’re also interested in stasis when we expect instability: given 
environmental variability, we might be surprised as to the long stability some lineages appear to 
exhibit. Perhaps we could consider the events as eventful in the sense that other possibilities 
were available but not taken. However, I think some narratives point to the opposite of eventful-
events: we explain why various different paths weren’t open in the first place, why the events 
weren’t eventful. ‘Leaving open or foreclosing’ a possibility is not what makes stasis worthy of 
narrative: it is sometimes the continuity that is surprising and deserving of explanation.  
Third, eventful-events and choice-points are evocative of possibility bottlenecks, momentary, 
discrete events where things could have gone one way or another. But change needn’t be 
sudden, and possibilities needn’t switch one way or the other at particular times and places. As 
we saw in Scannella, Fowler, Goodwin and Horner’s (2014) discussion of Triceratops, sometimes 
speciation is a gradual, incremental business. If Triceratops evolved phyletically, then there may 
have been no moment where things went one way or another. That is, there may not be a clearly 
delineated event or set of events which determined the trajectory. In such circumstances there 
are no eventful-events and thus nothing worth narrating on Beatty’s view. Focusing on choice-
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points misses both incremental and punctuated models of speciation. They miss incremental 
speciation because speciation in such cases are trends, rather than eventful-events; they miss 
punctuated speciation because in such cases the explanatory focus is on stasis. Why should the 
tumultuous change from the dinosaur-gymnosperm Mesozoic to the insect-angiosperm Cenozoic 
take explanatory precedence over the remarkable stability of those two systems? I see no good 
reason to think it should. 
These three objections have parallels for someone emphasizing stability and gradualism at 
the expense of fragility. History contains multitudes of kinds of change and stability and we 
shouldn’t privilege one over the other without good reason. Although Beatty is right to think that 
alluding to possibilities and relating them to the actual in a step-by-step manner is what 
narratives do well, tying this to choice-points focuses too much on change against stability, and 
points against trends. Peculiarity, I think, includes Beatty’s insights but goes further. History, I 
think, matters for knowledge because peculiarity demands narrative explanation. Recall our 
second question from the introduction: 
Does something’s history matter to the knowledge we can have of it? 
In answering this question, I want to identify a feature of history and demonstrate that some 
forms of knowledge are well-suited to capturing it. Peculiarity is not necessarily a feature of every 
past event: some things may not be peculiar, or may be only minimally so. Peculiarity, I hope, 
identifies the aspects of the past that are truly historical (that involve, for instance, Collingwood’s 
new forms). How do we show that some forms of knowledge are better suited to history (that is, 
peculiarity)? Recall Roth’s challenge: the distinctiveness of explanatory form turns on inter-
translatability; if I can reword a narrative explanation into a covering-law explanation then there 
is nothing special about narratives. By the contrasting approach I prefer, instead of asking in-
principle questions, we consider how different explanatory strategies generate understanding 
via different kinds of situating. Our challenge, then, is to show that some forms of knowledge 
(narrative explanations) are particularly good (or, stronger: uniquely good) at situating 
peculiarity.  
Recall Franklin-Hall’s distinction between synchronic and diachronic kinds. The former carves 
up the world in terms of essential properties, or at least via properties held at a time-slice. The 
latter carves the world either in terms of process-types (type-historical kinds) or token 
trajectories (token-historical kinds). The mid-Cretaceous Terrestrial Revolution is a token-
historical kind. It is an event drawn out over millions of years, sweeping up the biodiversity of a 
History Matters 
61 
 
wide range of taxa, from insects to mammals and birds. As we’ve seen, explaining the revolution 
requires: 
 (1) complexity: multiple different components, operating at different scales (from the 
relationship between continental breakup and radiations, to ecological resilience in different 
communities, to the browsing habits of dinosaurs versus other taxa);  
(2) disunity: although the revolution is in some ways similar to other radiations, it is unique, 
the details that made a difference are particular to that trajectory (the flexibility of angiosperms, 
or dinosaurs’ unsuitability to consuming them, for instance);  
(3) a temporal dimension: angiosperms went from their first emergence to near-dominance 
by the middle of the Cretaceous, understanding this requires a sequence lain out over time.  
These three are just the features I discussed concerning narrative explanations. Such 
explanations are tailor-made for situating complex, unique and temporally extended sequences. 
The peculiarity of the Cretaceous events we’ve considered, the robust angiosperm-insect 
alliance, the newly fragile dinosaur ecosystems, the radiating mammals and birds, and so forth, 
demand an explanation that can accommodate their complexity, interconnectedness, and long 
temporal scale. This calls for being situated in a token, multi-step (and multi-scale) trajectory. 
That is: a narrative. History matters because its peculiarity demands a narrative treatment; 
narratives are required to accommodate peculiar targets. The way history matters (‘gets into’) a 
peculiar target is because the modal profile of that target is specifically due to the processes that 
produce and maintain them; If we want to explain why our target changed as it did, or remained 
as it was, we must appeal to features of those processes. 
This view has at least two upshots. 
First, peculiarity accommodates—and potentially supports—realism about narrative events. 
Recall that both realists and anti-realists believe that there are facts about the past, however 
anti-realists think the narrative events—the structure their explanations lay onto the world—are 
projections, cognitive tools, not representations of how things were. Realists agree that 
narratives are cognitive tools for generating understanding, but go further to say that successful 
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narratives in fact reflect the structure of the world. Peculiarity is a real feature of the past: 
diversity-boosting processes really do lead to new stabilities, fragilities and novelties over time. 
And historical narratives represent that peculiarity. It may be that the significance of some events 
are only recognisable in terms of the peculiarity they generate downstream. Say, Gondwana’s 
breaking apart is important because of the subsequent terrestrial revolution. But it in no way 
follows from this that we construct those events, or that their existence depends upon historians 
recognising them. Its significance for the mid-Cretaceous revolution is not a projection, but real.  
The Cretaceous’ peculiarity is something we discover and that we can have (and paleontologists 
do have) substantive disagreements about.  
Second, as we saw, peculiarity explains the ‘localness’ of scientific knowledge. In part 1, we 
saw how evidence-generation in historical science often depends upon highly idiosyncratic 
knowledge tailored to the conditions at hand. In part 2, we saw it relied on exception-ridden, 
context sensitive (yet non-accidental) regularities. Given the peculiarity of history, this is just 
what we should expect: diversity-boosting processes generate both fragility and robustness in 
particular (peculiar!) processes. And these are only capturable in local ways (see also Beatty 
1997). The fragmented nature of historical knowledge is a response to the fragmented nature of 
history. This is why general, all-purpose accounts of evidence or explanation are of such limited 
use in understanding knowledge-generating practices. To be clear, none of this suggests that 
merely being in the past is what makes something epistemically local: our current world is 
without doubt peculiar, as will the future be. But it is in being peculiar that something’s history 
matters.  
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Concluding discussion: What are sciences of the deep past about? 
I’ve argued that history matters for knowledge. First, the past always features in evidential 
reasoning, because the provenance of data always matters for its deployment as evidence. 
Second, history is peculiar, and peculiarity demands narrative explanations. Neither of these big-
picture points are restricted to knowledge of the deep past (shallow pasts are included, and 
indeed we’ve seen how history matters to knowledge of current and future events too!) but both 
tell us something important about what our knowledge of the deep past is like. Like all empirical 
knowledge, the provenance and journeys of data—their past—makes a critical difference. 
Further, our knowledge of the deep past is likely to take a complex, narrative form. Our 
understanding it depends on it being situated within a trajectory moving through a space of 
possibilities. Getting that knowledge depends upon a complex social practice involving iterative 
investigations involving theoretically-grounded expectations, fieldwork, data-processing and 
storing, and data deployment in analyses and evidential claims. In the introduction, I also 
discussed one clear way in which knowledge of the deep past matters: some important questions 
are only answerable from that perspective. Evidence from the deep past is required to inform 
theorizing about, for instance, the origin of the universe, the formation of the Earth, the shape of 
life, and the unfolding of human culture across the globe.  
But what is the aim of sciences concerned with the deep past, what is the research ultimately 
about? This is my final question. Attending to philosophers of historical science (myself included), 
a kind of answer emerges: historical science is about telling the history of their subjects, tracing 
their unfolding and their eventual conversion into traces. Carol Cleland is perhaps the most 
explicit on this score: 
Hypotheses concerning long-past, token events are typically evaluated in terms of their 
capacities to explain puzzling associations among traces discovered through fieldwork 
(Cleland 2011, 552). 
The point of historical science is to explain the traces we see now. Are, for instance, the 
patterns in Pachycephalosaurus skull fossils, (some domed, some flat) best explained in terms of 
their having separate evolutionary histories (that is, being different species) or in terms of being 
part of a shared ontogenetic sequence? Answering these questions uncover particular histories. 
Aviezer Tucker also often talks in such terms: 
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The historical sciences are concerned with inferring common causes or origins: 
contemporary phylogeny and evolutionary biology infer the origins of species from 
homologies, DNA, and fossils; Comparative Historical Linguistics infers the origins of 
languages from information preserving aspects of existing languages and theories about 
the mutation and preservation of languages over time (Tucker 2012, 20). 
Like Cleland, Tucker takes the point of historical science to be provisioning particular 
histories, revealing the unfolding of whatever their subject is. No doubt this is an important goal: 
for instance, knowledge of such unfolding can form the basis of our understanding our own time 
and future (Currie 2018 chapter 12). But do such narrow conceptions of historical science really 
capture what the study of the deep past is about? That is, do they exhaust the point of studying 
the deep past? I don’t think so, and I think our discussion thus far has shown why. 
In contrast to philosophers who examine historical reconstruction from the perspective of 
methodology and epistemic puzzles, archaeological and historiographical theorists sometimes 
take a broader perspective. In archaeology, for instance, there is a tradition of contrasting 
accounts which emphasize archaeology as being about traces and trace-based reasoning and 
those which take archaeology as being about… something deeper. John Barrett captures this 
contrast particularly eloquently: 
Most outside observers, along with all too many practitioners, define archaeology in the 
banal terms of digging, discovery of old things, and the physical analysis of those things. 
It is from this perspective that the history of archaeology is written as the development 
of techniques of recovery and material analysis. This consigns archaeology to the role of 
antiquarianism… such a negative perception surely contrasts with the more challenging 
view that archaeology could offer itself, namely as an enquiry into the full chronology and 
global extent of humanity’s place in history. (Barrett 2016, 133-134, references removed)  
What is it to enquire into ‘the full chronology and global extent of humanity’s place in 
history’? One contrast might be between cataloguing material remains and inferring from them 
to the past, but I think more is going on. Barrett emphasizes the diversity of human life-ways, and 
the role of material conditions in enabling, shaping—but not determining—them. A culture’s 
material conditions do not in themselves decide everything about that culture, but they provide 
the stage upon which that culture acts. If storing information in written form is required for 
certain kinds of enquiry, then these enquiries will be difficult for nomadic groups who can’t cart 
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tons of books around. Archaeology, for Barrett, is about getting a grip on how material 
conditions enable human life ways: 
An engagement with an archaeological record often prompts the need to explain its 
formation. An engagement with the material conditions of human possibility on the other 
hand prompts the desire to understand those conditions…(137) 
Relatedly, Joan Gero has argued against a focus on certainty in archaeology and in favour of 
preserving the ambiguity of archaeological evidence and theorizing: roughly speaking, 
archaeologists should wear their interpretation’s underdetermination on their sleeves. Part of 
her argument is that this underwrites a more discursive and reflective science: 
[archaeologists should] work towards an archaeology that interrogates the past instead 
of advancing conclusions as exclusively and exhaustively final and “right” (Gero 2007, 
313). 
On one picture, archaeology is in the business of uncovering, explaining and understanding 
the actual history of the past; on another picture, the science is in the business of interrogating 
the past to understand the conditions of human existence. These richer views of the point of 
history emphasize (1) understanding the conditions of possibility, (2) a two-way, discursive 
approach to knowledge generation. The narrower accounts philosophers imply emphasize (1) 
explaining traces in terms of past events, (2) telling histories. These two accounts need not be 
mutually exclusive, indeed Gero argues that practices denying ambiguity “contradict the long-
term archaeological interests of accumulating accurate information about the past” (313). 
You might (perhaps echoing Collingwood) think that archaeology carries this value because 
its subjects are human, intentional subjects. I don’t think so. I’m going to close by arguing that 
the features folks like Bennet and Gero highlight for human history are not exclusive to humanity: 
they are values of investigations of the past generally. Sciences of the deep past are about 
uncovering the material conditions of existence, and are two-way discursive practices. This is 
seen when we connect these discussions with two features from earlier: the iterativity and 
dependency between idiographic and nomothetic investigations, and the peculiarity of history.  
In section 2.1, I argued that in practice historical science is ultimately neither nomothetic 
(concerned with understanding regularities) nor idiographic (concerned with particular histories) 
because both kinds of knowledge are mutually dependent. To understand whether or not 
Triceratops and Torosaurus are the same species, we need to appeal to general understandings of 
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biodiversity patterns, as well as our expectations about ontogenetic stages in those critters: the 
idiographic leans on the nomothetic. And those nomothetic theories are themselves built from 
interactions with particular cases. I highlighted the iterative nature of this interaction. Hasok 
Chang, analysing the history of measurement, similarly emphasizes what he calls ‘epistemic 
iterativity’: 
What we have is a process in which we throw very imperfect ingredients together and 
manufacture something just a bit less imperfect (Chang 2004, 226). 
As Kevin Elliot has pointed out (2012), such iterativity occurs both at the level of knowledge 
claims—between expectations about biodiversity and the particular taxonomic affiliation of 
specimens, say—and at the level of methods: between techniques of fossil preparation and their 
deployment as evidence about the past. This iterativity looks, at least to me, like exactly what we 
should expect from an interrogation of the past, of ‘conversing’ with other times. Iterative back-
and-forths also play a critical role in Bob Chapman and Alison Wylie’s explanation of the power of 
trace-based reasoning (my own notion of ‘methodological omnivory’ (2015, 2018) draws from the 
same well). Generally speaking, I think, science often progresses via the iterative construction 
and destruction of scaffolds (Walsh forthcoming), and this requires a two-way iterative process. 
This, I think, is a pretty close match to discussion of ‘discursive’ investigations of the past. It may 
be that I’ve missed some kind of normative dimension: our targets’ lacking intention could mean 
we don’t judge, criticize or empathize. But we can certainly compare. Our current world, 
angiosperm-rich with divided continents, differs profoundly from that of the early Cretaceous. 
And these comparisons may carry crucial lessons: as our world becomes ‘smaller’ through global 
connections, perhaps in some ways we return to Gondwana’s relative homogeneity, and the 
diversity-dampening that implies. Moreover, seeing the fall of the dinosaur-gymnosperm alliance 
reminds us that long term changes can undermine the most apparently stable of systems. Our 
increasing capacity to intervene at global levels should lead us to worry about the stability of the 
global systems we depend on. Dinosaurs managed millions of years, we’ve barely gone a hundred 
thousand. The discursive nature of investigations of the deep past leads to reflection on our 
current state and our future states, then: iterativity is not limited to knowledge and method. 
History’s peculiarity doesn’t only motivate narrative explanations, it also underlies concern 
about the conditions of existence. Many historical enquiries are not simply about telling the 
Earth’s history, but about understanding the ways in which Earth could have been (and perhaps 
could be). A world with a biology-produced, oxygen-rich atmosphere is a different prospect than 
one with depleted oxygen. A world with flowering plants is in many ways radically different from 
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one without them. A world with domesticated plants, agriculture, offers different 
opportunities—and costs—than one without them. Understanding peculiarity requires more 
than tracing a particular history, but getting to grips with how previous conditions laid the 
groundwork for, enabled, dampened and triggered later conditions. 
In investigating the deep past, then, we do not simply uncover a sequence of narratives. We 
also learn about the wild variety and diversity of history, and the modal properties underlying and 
enabling those forms. We don’t simply learn about how continents breaking apart and flowering 
plants evolving led to a dramatic revolution in many of the world’s biotas, we also learn about the 
relationships between biodiversity, geography, and adaptation. We learn about the conditions 
required for the emergence of stable dynamics like the insect-angiosperm alliance and the 
conditions leading to the dissolution of stability, as with the dinosaur extinction. We don’t simply 
tell a history, but uncover the conditions of existence. Rich views of the purpose and nature of 
history are not restricted to human history, therefore. The deep past carries this value. 
And this carries with it a lesson for how philosophy of science should be done. In the 
introduction I presented a methodological dilemma: how can my analysis of historical knowledge 
be normative if it is based on descriptions of practice? The answer is that the 
‘descriptive/normative’ dichotomy is too coarse to capture the nature of the argument being 
made. Rather—and similarly to history—in examining scientific practice I bring my 
preconceptions about science (the nature of evidence, explanations, and so forth) and those 
preconceptions shape how I go about that examination. But scientific practice will not bend any 
way I desire: it pushes back and in turn shapes those conceptions. That is, the examination is 
iterative, mingling normative philosophical theory with descriptions of scientific practice. There is 
no methodological dilemma here. 
And so, history matters for knowledge in many ways, and as we’ve seen this should lead us to 
de-emphasize synchronic characterization—avoid idealizing away from history—and adopt more 
local approaches to understanding and explanation. History doesn’t just matter for scientific 
knowledge, then, it also matters for philosophy.  
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